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Abstract: 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) use U.S. Compustat firm data for the 1980s to obtain meas-
ures of manufacturing sectors’ Dependence on External Finance (DEF), i.e., finance 
external to the firm. They take any differences in these measures to be 
structural/technological and thus applicable to other countries. Their joint assumptions 
about how to obtain representative values of DEF by sector and about why these values 
differ fundamentally between sectors have been adopted in additional studies seeking to 
show that sectors benefit unequally from a country’s level of financial development. 
However, the assumptions as such have not been examined. The present study, 
conducted with cyclically adjusted annual measures of DEF derived from U.S. industry 
data for 1977-1997, attempts to do so using data that are aggregated by sector. We find 
that those variables that may be regarded as structural/technological have very low 
explanatory power, and that the DEF figures calculated from micro data do not 
correspond closely to what is obtained from aggregate figures. Hence key assumptions 
on which RZ's argumentation is based have not been validated. 
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1      Introduction  
 
This paper examines the measure of Dependence on External Finance (DEF) by 
manufacturing-industry sector introduced by Rajan and Zingales (RZ, 1998) and the 
evidence for the conceptual properties attributed to it. This work has had lasting 
influence: The authors’ measure, and its application and interpretation, have been 
widely adopted and remain in use. For this reason both the construction of the measure 
and the characteristics attributed to it deserve close and respectful scrutiny. 
A firm’s DEF is defined as the difference between capital expenditures (CE) on 
fixed assets and cash flow (CF) from operations divided by CE, DEF ≡ (CE - CF)/CE = 
1 – CF/CE. RZ derived that measure from Compustat Statements of Cash Flow and 
other Compustat data items for listed U.S. companies, selecting the median firm per 
sector. We contrast the particular features of the RZ measure with those of an 
alternative measure derived from a quite different database not hitherto utilized in this 
context. We check the correlation between these two U.S.-based measures and weight 
by the relative importance of industry sectors to check on the robustness of construction 
and the representativeness of the measures derived. We then use the alternative, 
macroeconomic, measure to shed light on the inherent characteristics attributed to RZ’s 
original measure but not testable with it. Thus we focus on two key questions about the 
U.S. DEF data by use of our alternative data construct:  
(1) To what extent are the microeconomic U.S. data which RZ selected to characterize 
the DEF values of each sector suited to represent that whole sector’s financing 
needs in the United States?  
(2)  Are the differences in the U.S. DEF values by sector attributable to identifiable 
factors that may be regarded as structural/technological? 
By examining solely the derivation and properties of DEF, the paper covers only 
the first step essential in scientific analysis. That step relates to the validation of 
measures central to a particular hypothesis and its tests. Now that DEF has been used as 
a building block of a new theory of comparative advantage without first completing that 
step, we are going back and asking whether the measure and known properties of DEF 
qualify the construct to play such a role. We next describe the theory in which DEF 
figures as the key operational concept. 
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1.1. A new theory of comparative advantage 
As laid out for instance by Levine (2004), Rousseau and Wachtel (2005), and 
Arestis, Chortareas and Desli (2006), domestic financial development has implications 
for (a) risk sharing and consumption smoothing, (b) economic stability, (c) the level of 
economic growth, and (d) the structure of growth by sector. Only the last of these 
aspects, linking financial development to comparative advantage, concerns us here.1  
Theories seeking to explain international differences in the relative growth rates of 
industries on the basis of comparative advantage typically are applied in two steps:  
(i) First, technological characteristics are identified by sector from data gathered 
in advanced countries with the most developed and open factor and product markets. In 
applications of the Scandinavian (or Heckscher-Ohlin) theory of comparative advan-
tage, for example, sectors may be characterized by production-function parameters rep-
resenting their inherent degree of capital intensity. 
(ii) Countries with differences in their relative endowments ─ in the previous 
example, an economy’s endowment of capital versus labor ─, when brought into contact 
with one another through external opening only of product markets, then would display 
predictable differences in the industrial structure of growth: Labor-intensive industries 
would grow faster for a time than capital-intensive industries in countries relatively well 
endowed with labor, and the reverse would hold in those well endowed with capital. As 
a result, factor-specific international specialization of production would be enhanced. 
Following this scheme, RZ (1998) classified manufacturing sectors in a way that 
could be relevant to comparative rates of growth by sector in different countries, 
depending on their level of domestic financial development (FD).2 RZ’s classification 
                                                 
1  Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2006) have critically examined the first three factors or effects in a 
global context. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006, p. 2) have formulated the key current research questions 
relating to the growth effects of financial markets on the level and structure of industry-sector growth. 
2  FD is indicated by stock-to-flow ratios such as M2/GDP or credit to the private sector plus stock-
market capitalization over GDP. Further distinctions are between bank-based and market-based 
systems (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2001) and by degree of concentration in the banking sector (Cetorelli 
and Gambera, 2001; Andersen and Tarp, 2003). Other characteristics considered are legal traditions 
relating to creditor rights and contract enforcement, and the quality of accounting systems and of 
regulations affecting intermediary development and efficiency (see RZ, 1998, p. 576; Levine, Loayza 
and Beck, 1999; de Serres et al., 2006; and Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). The latter, as well as 
Caballero (2006) and others, also consider how much financial development reduces financial frictions 
and speeds technology adoption and capital reallocation. Berger and Udell (2005) consider the entire 
menu of lending and transactions technologies in use in a country, plus its structures of relationship 
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relied on a particular measure, the median firm’s DEF, to reveal a latent technological 
characteristic of its sector. Assuming local financial development matters, as later 
confirmed by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) and Stulz (2005), they then 
investigated whether international differences in the structure of growth by sector can be 
linked to differences in domestic financial development that make it easier to raise 
funds from outside the firm in some countries than in others.  
1.2. Structural/technological reasons for differences in DEF by sector? 
RZ (1998, p. 563) subsumed that “there is a technological reason why some indus-
tries depend more on external finance than others... [T]hese technological differences 
persist across countries, so that we can use an industry’s dependence on external funds 
as identified in the United States as a measure of its dependence in other countries.” 
They then tested the inference that a high (low) level of FD in a country favors the 
growth of industries most (least) dependent on external finance as revealed by US data 
for the 1980s.3 Laeven, Klingebiel, and Krozner (2002) have added and tested the 
corollary that financial crises have a disproportionately negative impact on these 
sectors. Pre-2004 studies surveyed in von Furstenberg (2004) directly using RZ’s 
estimates, and more recent studies using RZ-like data constructs4 (e.g., Ciccone and 
Papaioannou, 2006; Serres et al., 2006), with few exceptions (e.g., Andersen and Tarp, 
2003; Fisman and Love, 2004), have tended to support the inference above. The 2006 
studies cited above have focused on new issues, such as DEF’s influence on the speed 
of capital reallocation between sectors or across (sub-national) regulatory boundaries.  
As technological factors why some sectors depend more on external finance than 
others, RZ (p. 563) list differences in initial project scale, the gestation period, the cash 
                                                                                                                                               
lending, to predict the effectiveness of financial services for particular sectors. Edison et al. (2002), 
Chari and Henry (2002), and Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda (2004) focus instead on identifying the effect of 
international financial integration on economic growth to which FDI may contribute. 
3  Because of the cross-sectional orientation of their work, RZ (1998) do not consider how especially 
rapid advances in FD may affect the structure of growth in a country even if the sample-period average 
level of its FD is low. This is done in von Furstenberg (2004) for Poland after its emergence from so-
cialism. The study finds no support for the Rybczynski-effect hypothesis that more of the factor 
“finance” through rapid FD favors the growth of industry-sectors more the higher their DEF.  
4  An RZ-like measure is defined as the median of the time-averaged DEF values of firms in each industry 
sector. This median is regarded as yielding a fixed and universal characteristic of that sector. Laeven, 
Klingebiel, and Krozner (2002) apply the RZ data construction method exactly but to a particular set of 
3-digit ISIC industries. Firm-level databases other than Compustat and averages for periods other than 
the 1980s may also be used in RZ-like measures. 
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harvest period, and the amount of follow-on investments required. RZ did not test 
whether any of these correlate as expected with their measure of DEF by sector. And 
indeed the bearing of the factors they listed on the DEF values of firms could well be 
limited to the start-up phase of their business and to any subsequent growth spurts. As 
others since have demonstrated directly, industries that are populated by young and 
small firms have the highest sensitivity to cash flow and the greatest DEF.5 Yet, 
considering, say, the history of Microsoft’s position in its sector, the distribution of 
firms by size, age and financing needs is not likely to be fixed and universal in a sector. 
To address this problem of sectors maturing and experiencing changing financing 
needs, RZ gave separate attention to the “young” and “mature” among “all” companies 
and to the extent to which growth is produced by an increase in the number of firms in a 
sector rather than an increase in their average size. They found (pp. 577-579) that while 
the development of financial markets has a disproportional impact on the growth in the 
number of firms, the interaction between their measure of DEF and an array of proxies 
for financial development is not statistically significant for growth in the average size of 
firms and, unexpectedly, much weaker for “young” than for “all” companies in a sector. 
Hence what exactly is behind differences in DEF by sector that could make these 
differences structural/technological as RZ maintain has remained uncertain. 
Reducing that uncertainty is difficult because structural/technological, when used 
to describe factors accounting for differences in DEF between sectors, technically is a 
fuzzy characteristic. Properties of production functions such as the specification of 
human capital and technological progress, scale effects, elasticity of factor substitution, 
and factor intensity may have nearly 100 percent membership in the concept. 
Characteristics of input use within sectors, such as the depreciation rate and materials 
intensity, or the degree of dependence on external inputs, have a smaller, but still high, 
degree of membership. Characteristics that may be relevant to the cash flow process in 
relation to investment, such as the riskiness of a sector and its leverage and 
collateralization potential, may also claim some degree of membership in the concept of 
being structural/technological.  
                                                 
5  See, for instance, Beck et al. (2005), and Acharya, Imbs, and Sturgess (2006). Cooley and Quadrini 
(2003), and Clementi and Hopenhayen (2006) discuss models in which the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment varies with size only since size is positively correlated with the age of firms, or vice versa. 
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RZ’s own conjectures offer some guidance on where to look for structural/ 
technological origins of differences in U.S. DEF by industry sectors: They have to lie in 
financing structures directly associated with the cash flow generation process and its 
relation to planned investment. Indeed, they (1998, pp. 581-583) demonstrate (through 
the absence of significant interaction of DEF with endowment variables other than the 
level of FD, such as average years of schooling completed, in growth regressions) that 
differences in their measures of U.S. DEF by sector are indeed inherently financial. RZ 
likewise reject the hypothesis that financial development is just a concomitant of 
economic development. They then look upon the DEF values observed in the United 
States as a fundamental characteristic of industry sectors that interacts with the degree 
of FD in 41 other countries to determine their patterns of comparative advantage. 
Whether DEF can in fact be viewed as a fundamental characteristic of 
manufacturing sectors in the United States and, at least latently, in other countries and 
over time may have implications for price relations in finance as well as for the 
expected industry structure of economic growth. Cochrane (2005, p. 18; see pp. 95-103 
for references) notes that, to explain pricing anomalies, empirical papers now routinely 
form portfolios by sorting on characteristics other than the three Fama-French “priced 
factors” that include firm size and book-to-market-value portfolios. Among such other 
sorting criteria for listed firms may be their industry-production (e.g., primary metals) 
or final-demand (e.g., consumer durables) sector when differences in return 
characteristics of firms in such sectors are not fully explained by CAPM valuation plus 
priced factor models. Cochrane (2005, p. 22) conjectures that good cash-flow news 
could bring growth options into the money, and this event could increase the systematic 
risk (betas) of the winner stocks. Cash-flow news then has more effect on highly 
levered, or otherwise external-financing constrained, high DEF than on low DEF 
sectors. If this systematic risk element is not priced as expected, DEF by sector could 
itself become a priced factor, identifying an anomalous pattern found in the equilibrium 
cross-section of returns, if DEF were, in fact, a fundamental characteristic of these 
industry sectors. Hence the critical question of whether DEF is a characteristic of firms 
that is distributed over manufacturing sectors in a way that is anchored in stable 
fundamentals is of broad consequence beyond the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
that brought us to it. 
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1.3. Outline by section 
Using a rich and self-contained macroeconomic data source, we rely on aggregate 
U.S. industry-level data from the (U.S. Department of Commerce) Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), rather than firm-level data, to yield annual DEFit values for the i = 
1,…S, S = 21 sectors and t = 1,...T, T = 21 years, 1977-97. This is the maximum 
number of years, straddling RZ’s 1980-89 data combination period, for which all the 
data used here were available on a consistent basis. It will be convenient to use Reliance 
on Internal Finance, RIF, where RIF = 1 – DEF = CF/CE, instead of DEF, because our 
DEF values are often negative. In Section 2 we compare the databases used by RZ and 
by us and subject our annual RIF data to explicit cyclical adjustment rather than using 
decadal averaging as in RZ. Section 3 decomposes variations in our cyclically-adjusted 
measure, RIFadj, along with variations in its explanatory variables, into between-sector 
and within-sector variations. In this decomposition the primary grouping criterion is 
either the manufacturing sector or the year of observation, and weights, Wi, by size of 
investment in a sector are applied. Section 4 identifies and models non-cyclical 
constituents of RIF that are the primary determinants of RIFadj. Using the between-
sector and within-sector deviations of all variables separately, Section 5 presents the 
two sets of regression results. Section 6 interprets these results by considering which of 
the determinants of RIFadj may deserve to be called structural/technological.  
Our measure, RIFadj, thus is meant for testing (1) the representativeness of data 
obtained from the median firm and (2) for shedding light on the properties attributed to 
such data. This second objective is facilitated because BEA offers a variety of integrated 
databases comprising national income, product, and fixed-asset accounting that are 
useful to characterize economic and financial conditions and relative price changes by 
sector and over time. These connected databases make it possible to investigate possibly 
structural/technological reasons for differences in RIFadj by sector. 
2.  Alternative databases and data adjustments 
This section answers the first of our two research questions, about the representa-
tiveness of the RZ measure, by describing the construction of their measure and of our 
alternative measure which we derived from a different source. It then describes the 
cyclical adjustment of the latter. 
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2.1. Available macroeconomic and microeconomic U.S. databases compared 
The RZ Compustat-based measures, one per sector i, are the DEFi values obtained 
for the median exchange-listed firm in the respective distributions by DEFi of “young”, 
“mature” and “all companies.” To recall, the ratio on which we focus is RIFi = (CF/CE)i 
= 1 – DEFi. Cash Flow, CF, is estimated as the gross (of capital consumption 
allowances) return on capital, minus taxes, including product and (corporation) income 
taxes, and minus net interest paid. Although not only fixed capital assets, but also 
intangible capital and working capital, including inventories, need to be financed and 
require a return, RZ use Compustat North America’s annual data item #128, defined as 
consisting of gross “additions to the company’s property, plant, and equipment, ex-
cluding amounts arising from acquisitions.” They thus limit Capital Expenditures, CE, 
to gross investment in fixed capital assets, while reflecting inventory change and 
changes in receivables and payables in the measure of cash flow.  
The BEA data are aggregates for all the establishments of corporations and 
proprietors engaged in manufacturing in the United States. They thus represent entire 
industry sectors rather than having each sector represented by its median (by size of 
DEF) Compustat-based measure for exchange-listed U.S. firms. Compustat assigns each 
firm to a single Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) that is derived from its largest 
sector of operations even though the firm may have operations in several sectors and 
consolidated subsidiaries in several countries (on consolidation see Mills and Plesko, 
2003, p. 869). By contrast, establishments are U.S.-based and much more specialized 
and numerous than firms. Establishments, defined for the purposes of the SIC as 
“economic units, generally at a single physical location, where business is conducted or 
where services or industrial operations are performed,” are far less likely than entire 
firms to straddle industry sectors.6 In short, listed firms, on account of their size, may be 
                                                 
6  The definition is from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/FAweb/Articles.Intro.html. Investment in fixed 
assets by establishment is benchmarked to the Census of Capital Expenditures conducted in conjunc-
tion with the decennial Economic Census (its most recent date was 1997) and updated with data from 
the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey. Principal source data for value-added components and the ex-
tent to which they were obtained on an establishment basis or require conversion from an enterprise to 
an establishment basis are identified in Moyer et al. (2004, especially Table C, p. 46). The allocation of 
net interest paid by each firm to establishments in the different SIC sectors it may contain, which is 
done on the basis of their net stock of fixed capital, indicates that CF reported for establishments is not 
entirely divorced from characteristics, such as the borrowing ability, of the firm to which they belong. 
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conglomerates of quite different production facilities and outputs, while establishments 
in a given SIC class are much more homogeneous in those regards.  
Furthermore, if sectors typically consist of a few large and many more small listed 
firms, chances are that the median firm is small, though not necessarily young,7 and that 
the large, well-established firms that carry much of the weight lie on the left (right) side 
of it in the distribution by size of DEF (RIF). To illustrate with RZ’s own data (1998, p. 
567), one such sector that would appear to fit this description is Drugs and Medicines 
(ISIC 3522). Its DEF is reported as 2.06 for “young” companies, 0.03 for mature 
companies, and 1.46 for “all” companies. Hence pooling young and mature has the 
median of “all” listed firms look rather “young” in this sector.8 This may explain in part 
why the BEA-based average aggregate measures of DEF and DEFadj = 1 - RIFadj shown 
in cols. [3] and [6] of Table 1 are lower than the RZ measures for the median listed firm 
even when that firm is drawn from the subset of “mature” companies that went public 
ten or more years ago.9 The fact that median firms may not well represent the balance-
sheet and income-sector account aggregates for their entire sector has been noted by 
others who also found that sector-wide DEF values are frequently negative, meaning 
                                                 
7  If the median firm is relatively small, it does not fit well with RZ’s (1998, p. 560) characterizations: 
“Under the assumption that capital markets in the United States, especially for the large listed firms we 
analyze, are relatively frictionless, this method allows us to identify an industry’s technological 
demand for external financing. Under the further assumption that such a technological demand carries 
over to other countries, we examine whether industries that are more dependent on external financing 
grow relatively faster in countries that, a priori, are more financially developed” (italics added). On the 
other hand, if the median firm were large and mature, none of the reasons RZ suggested for regarding 
differences in the resulting measures of DEF between sectors as structural/technological would apply.  
8  There are other lessons to be learned about the instability of component estimates based on median firm 
DEF characteristics. RZ’s estimates (1998, p. 567) show that mature companies in ISIC 362, glass (and 
related products) had the same DEF, 0.03, as in the drug sector. But the DEF for “young” companies 
was 1.52, and for “all” companies only 0.53 in the glass sector. Because, unlike in the drugs-biotech 
sector, the number of small and young listed companies in the glass sector is relatively small and scale 
economies loom large, “all” companies look rather “mature” in the glass sector, but “young” in the 
drug sector.  Hence going by “mature” companies, the DEF values for the drugs and glass sectors are 
exactly the same. For “young” companies they are a third higher for “drugs” than “glass.” But for “all” 
companies they are almost three times as high on account of the compositional asymmetry just noted. 
9  As shown near the end of cols. [3] and [2] of Table 1, the annual average of cyclically adjusted DEF 
(DEFadj) values for 1980-89 was -0.94 unweighted and -0.64 weighted, compared with values of 0.02 
and 0.08 for RZ’s mature companies (at least 10 years past their IPO). The preferred weighting here is 
by the square root of the CE weights, Wi, so that the variances-covariances reported in Table 2 will be 
weighted by these size weights, Wi. The weighting of the Sum of Squared Total (SST), Within-Sector 
(SSW), and Between-Sector (SSB) deviations in the Limdep Version 8 program used throughout is 
fully laid out in Appendix 3. For details on comparing BEA-based and RZ’s data concepts and values 
see Appendix 2. Values of DEF < 0 and RIF > 1 does not signify net portfolio investment by the 
median firm or sector concerned as long as dividends are paid at a rate (in relation to CE) at least equal 
equal to the excess of RIF over 1. 
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Table 1. Reclassified RZ DEF Measures for “All” and “Mature” Companies, and 
BEA Measures of DEF, Various Periods, for 1987 SIC U.S. Manufacturing Sectors 
and their Weighted Averages 
 1980-1989 RZ Def DEFadj DEF (BEA) 
 All Mature 1980-89 1976-86 1980-89 1987-97 
Column: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lumber 0.280 0.250 -2.684 -2.151 -2.850 -3.460 
Furniture  0.240 0.330 -0.900 -0.835 -0.980 -1.000 
Stone Clay Glass 0.199 0.113  0.031 0.011 0.094 -0.355 
Primary Metals 0.058 0.082  0.045 0.112 0.099 -0.137 
Fabricated Metal 0.240 0.040 -1.199 -1.054 -1.269 -1.589 
Machinery 0.626 0.232 -0.651 -0.667 -0.736 -0.902 
Electric Machinery 0.954 0.339 -0.864 -0.278 -0.654 -1.806 
Motor Vehicles 0.390 0.110 -1.383 -1.251 -1.720 -1.421 
Other Transpo. Eq. 0.325 0.148  1.225 1.449 1.050  1.120 
Instruments 0.960 0.190  0.477 -0.040 0.568  1.003 
Misc. Manufacture 0.470  -0.050 -3.279 -2.280 -3.235 -4.133 
Food & Beverages 0.127  -0.071 -0.671 -0.670 -0.822 -0.727 
Tobacco   -0.450  -0.380 -1.118 -1.465 -1.061 -5.023 
Textiles 0.137 0.043 -0.222 -0.265 -0.152 -0.199 
Apparel 0.030  -0.020 -2.355 -2.272 -2.303 -2.197 
Paper 0.160 0.120 -0.198 -0.131 -0.212 -0.229 
Printing 0.200 0.140 -1.241 -1.477 -1.121 -0.952 
Chemical Products 0.476  -0.052 -0.849 -0.602 -0.905 -1.159 
Petrol.& Coal Prod. 0.078 0.004  0.862 1.230 1.075  0.565 
Rubber & Plastics 0.957  -0.120 -0.144 -0.234 -0.169  0.106 
Leather Products    -0.115  -1.019 -4.532 -2.653 -4.357 -6.755 
Average 0.302 0.020 -0.936 -0.739 -0.936 -1.393 
--Weighted byWi0.5 0.370 0.078 -0.645 -0.518 -0.658 -0.934 
--Weighted by Wi 0.412 0.096 -0.567 -0.445 -0.586 -0.811 
Notes: The data in columns [1] and [2], reclassified from 36 ISIC Rev. 2 sectors to 21 1987 SIC sectors, 
are derived in Appendix Tables A2 and A3, respectively. ISIC Rev. 2 stands for International Standard 
Industrial Classification, Revision 2. Weighting is by the capital expenditure weights by sector (Wi) later 
shown in column [4] of Table 2, with the square-root weights, Wi0.5, for the present purpose of presenting 
a selection of weighted averages below the line, conveniently normalized to sum to 1. 
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that cash flow tends to exceed capital expenditures in the aggregate. To get closer to the 
RZ values, de Serres et al. (2006, p. 44), for instance, experimentally excluded all firms 
with more than 1,000 employees “so as to have more industries with positive 
dependence ratios.” 
The BEA data also show that, judging by capital expenditures (CE) on fixed 
assets, which is the denominator of both DEF and RIF, the largest and the smallest of 
the 21 distinct SIC sectors differ in size by a factor of 75. Large sectors have aggregate 
RIF values that cluster together, are poorly aligned with those based on the median firm, 
and are lower on average than for the smaller sectors. The difference weighting by CE 
makes is underscored by the correlation between the RZ decadal (1980-89) measures 
(redistributed into the 21 BEA sectors) for “mature” companies and our average annual 
measures for 1980-89 being 0.53 unweighted, but -0.06 weighted. The correlation of 
our measure with the RZ measure for “all” companies is even more distant: 0.24 
unweighted and -0.11 weighted. Hence the RZ measures are at best weakly 
macroeconomically representative for manufacturing sectors in the United States, the 
country from which they were derived.10 
2.2. Cyclical adjustment of RIFit to obtain RIFadjit 
Continuing to take RZ (1998) as reference guide, whereas RZ sought to eliminate 
the influence of “cyclical” factors through decade-long aggregation, directly adjusting 
the annual RIF data for each sector provides better control and preserves annual 
residuals that may contain information on changing non-cyclical characteristics.11 Even 
if successful in cyclical adjustment, neither method ensures that the resulting estimates 
represent a stationary (RZ’s measure) or potentially moving (our measure) equilibrium. 
                                                 
10  The correlation between RZ’s own measures of DEF for “all companies” and “mature” companies is 
0.475 unweighted (and 0.612 with our weights). RZ (1998, p. 572, Part B[1]) report the almost 
identical value of 0.46 for their 36 sectors. This suggests that relevant features of their data have been 
preserved in the conversion to the 21 sectors for which data are provided by the BEA in the sources 
followed. These sources are identified in Appendix 2. 
11  Constructing a decennial (decadal) data set does not provide the best estimate of the desired  
information. It may be granted that in sectors with low growth and little price change, aggregating 
numerator and denominator of RIF over a decade, before dividing, yields a value that is almost the 
same as the 10-year average of annual values of RIF for the same sector. Yet, as a BIS publication 
(Skoczylas and Tissot, 2005, p. 11) has criticized, cyclical adjustment by means of averaging over a 
complete cycle assumes that no structural change can occur during a business cycle, “an assumption 
that seems too restrictive.” 
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In RZ’s estimates, idiosyncrasies of the median listed firm12 in the DEF distribution by 
sector may add to the lack of representativeness compared with our aggregate measure. 
As specified in detail in Appendix 1, cyclical adjustment aims to eliminate the ef-
fect of aggregate-demand shocks and sector-specific supply shocks from the solution of 
an employment and output optimization model with nominal wage rigidity. The model 
uses a three-factor production function, including intermediate inputs, and Dixit-Stiglitz 
aggregation of both quantities and prices of the S sectors. The latter involves a uniform 
elasticity of substitution of θ>>1 between any two products that also equals the relative-
price elasticity of demand for each sector’s share of output. In the short-run, output by 
sector responds to aggregate demand disturbances affecting manufacturing as a whole 
and to supply disturbances affecting specific sectors within it. These supply distur-
bances are represented by temporary deviations from trend in two sector-specific rela-
tive prices that the model requires and our BEA “Industry” database, unlike Compustat, 
affords. We then proceed to estimate, and from there to eliminate, the effect of these 
cyclical disturbances on RIF, while keeping all other, possibly structural, innovations. 
The two relative prices that may be subject to cyclical disturbances from their 
trend are first the price (P) of sector i’s gross output (GOit) relative to that of the total 
manufacturing (m) sector at time t (GOmt), PGOit/PGOmt, and second the price of sector 
i’s intermediate inputs (IIit) in relation to its value added (VAit), or PIIit /PVAit. All de-
viation rates in these relative prices from trend were estimated as residuals from a re-
gression with linear time trend fitted to the log-transformed data for the period 1977-
1997. As reported in Appendix 2, which covers data sources, industry classifications, 
and construction of variables at the industry level, the industry data required were avail-
able only up to 1997 on the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC87) basis that 
can be made comparable to the international classification, ISIC Rev. 2, for 36 sectors 
used in RZ (1998). Although the aggregate demand disturbances were taken to be of 
monetary origin, the derivation in Appendix 1 shows that their effects can be 
                                                 
12  For instance, for radio, television and communications equipment manufacturing (ISIC 3832), RZ 
(1998, p. 567) report that the median firm in “all” companies had external dependence greater than 1, 
with its 1980-89 aggregate of cash flow negative. At the same time, the ratio of its capital expenditures 
to net property, plant and equipment was the fifth highest among the 36 sectors, indicating strong 
growth. In fact, during this and the next decade, the radio and television equipment part of this sector 
was withering away in the United States while communications equipment manufacturing was still 
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represented equivalently by the logarithmic deviation rates (D) in total manufacturing 
employment (Lmt) from trend, DlnLmt. Because industry sectors have different 
exposures to these transitory factors, time-series regressions for each sector are used to 
adjust each sector’s 21 annual RIF measures separately for its own “cyclical” effects.  
The cyclical deviations in RIFit = (CF/CE)it, which are to be eliminated by use of 
equation (1), then are estimated sector-by-sector with the equation: 
RIFit = ai + bi DlnLmt + ci Dln(PGOit/PGOmt)+ di Dln(PIIit/PVAit) + eit (1)
The cyclically-adjusted values, RIFadjit, are obtained by setting all three temporary 
deviations from trend, each starting with D, to zero. Equation (1) then yields RIFadjit as 
the sum of the sector’s intercept, ai, and its time-specific non-cyclical annual remainder, 
eit. The adjustment leaves the mean of RIFadjit for the data period as a whole precisely 
the same as that of RIFit for any i but with a variance that is only 68-69% as large as that 
of RIFit on average per sector, both with and without weighting. According to column 3 
of Table 2, the range of this variance ratio, equal to 1-R2, is from 23% in the highly 
cyclical Primary Metal Industries, to 96% in the category of Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing Industries producing mostly consumer items that are in steady demand. 
Comparing the unweighted and weighted averages in columns 3 and 5 of Table 2 
shows that weighting the variance ratios of each sector by its average annual investment 
share during the 1980s made little difference in this instance. However, it is important 
to note from columns 1 and 4 that tobacco and leather products, each with a weight of 
well under 1 percent, account for over 60% of the total variance of RIFadjit.13 To keep 
small sectors from dominating the results makes weighting essential in this investigation 
that aims to uncover representative macroeconomic relationships. 
The cyclical and transitory factors affecting RIFit are not stable structural/tech-
nological characteristics of industry sectors. Rather they relate to the degree of their 
                                                                                                                                               
thriving.  Hence it would not appear that the median U.S. firm could deliver a good approximation to 
equilibrium DEF in the sector for the United States, let alone for the rest of the world, in this instance.  
13  It is tempting to attribute this outlier status to small sectors being more specialized and pure than large 
sectors that yield averages over a wider range of establishments. However, this need not be so: While 
establishments in the tobacco sector are perhaps quite homogeneous, miscellaneous manufacturing in-
dustries, another small sector, produce an odd collection of manufactures not elsewhere classified. This 
collection includes jewellery and plated ware, musical instruments, toys and athletic goods, writing 
utensils and artists’ materials, costume novelties, brooms and brushes, and caskets. 
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Table 2.  Variances of RIF With and Without Adjustment for "Cyclical" Effects, 
also with unexplained percentage of the variance weighted by sectors’ capital ex-
penditure (CE) shares 
      
 Variance  Variance of    [1]as%of[2] CE Share  Entries in [3]  
 of Adjusted Unadjusted equals 1980-89  Weighted 
 RIF RIF  100(1 – R2) Avg.=Wi by CE Share 
Column: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lumber & Wood Pr. 0.95096 1.08019 88.03578 0.02186 1.92445 
Furniture & Fixtures 0.32545 0.44339 73.40097 0.00903 0.66298 
Stone, Clay & Glass 0.18858 0.25394 74.26260 0.03017 2.24021 
Primary Metal Ind. 0.05221 0.22635 23.06501 0.05701 1.31500 
Fabricated Metal Pr. 0.15995 0.19007 84.15274 0.05044 4.24497 
IndMachinery&Equip 0.11212 0.13788 81.31166 0.10301 8.37601 
Electr&Electronic Eq. 0.61631 0.70327 87.63471 0.10414 9.12589 
Motor Vehicles& Eq. 1.09177 1.55869 70.04420 0.06655 4.66127 
Other Transport. Eq. 0.37621 0.91553 41.09199 0.04988 2.04954 
Instruments&Related 0.39406 0.41774 94.33218 0.04710 4.44350 
Misc. Manuf. Indust. 1.53432 1.59304 96.31391 0.00875 0.84302 
Food & Kindred Pr. 0.04042 0.12677 31.88350 0.08483 2.70453 
Tobacco Products 5.83179 8.62577 67.60893 0.00865 0.58449 
Textile Mill Products 0.02283 0.06352 35.94520 0.02230 0.80171 
Apparel& O.Tex.Pr. 0.14755 0.21346 69.12280 0.00906 0.62636 
Paper & Allied Pr. 0.02975 0.04858 61.23345 0.06936 4.24691 
Printing & Publishing 0.11262 0.15667 71.88864 0.05292 3.80416 
Chemicals & Allied 0.13381 0.14542 92.01373 0.12272 11.29148 
Petrol. and Coal Pr. 0.37138 0.67678 54.87514 0.04575 2.51072 
Rubber&MiscPlastics 0.05513 0.09963 55.33538 0.03484 1.92792 
Leather& Leather Pr. 5.83837 6.47070 90.22789 0.00164 0.14779 
Sum,[5]=Weight.Avg.  18.385* ... ... 1.00000 68.53292 
Arithmetic Avg. 0.87550 1.14988 68.75145 ... ... 
Geometric  Mean 0.25539 0.39540 64.59030 ... ... 
 
* This sum of the sectoral variances of RIFadj, times 21, the number of observations per sector, equals the 
within-sector sum of squares, SSW(i), of 386.1 shown in the Part A[1] of Table 3. 
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exposure to fluctuations in aggregate and sectoral demand, and in supply and demand 
conditions for intermediate inputs used by the establishments in a particular industry 
sector.14After adjusting for these factors, 89 of the 210 pairwise correlation coefficients 
between the time series of RIFadjit for 21 manufacturing-industry sectors, i.e., over 40 
percent, are negative so that any remaining time-linked factors with a joint impact on all 
sectors are unimportant, as we subsequently confirm. 
In sum, it was found that the cyclical and transitory factors on average account for 
almost one-third of the variance of RIFit by sector. Eliminating their influence on RIFit 
yields the cyclically adjusted variable RIFadjit. Because this variable is comparable to the 
RZ measure of RIFRZ ≡ 1 – DEFRZ, it is the data whose behavior across sectors and over 
time is analyzed in the remainder of this paper. 
3. Determinants of between-group and within-group variation in 
 RIFadjit 
This section deals with a number of methodological issues, in particular the need 
for weighting, before showing the construction of between-group and within-group de-
viations in variables and descriptive statistics for them. 
3.1. Methodological issues 
The RZ assumption about differences in RIFRZ being structural/technological, 
relates solely to the interpretation of between-group effects, where Group = Sector(i), 
since they derive only a single cross-section of data. This imposed limitation cannot 
mean that such differences in actuality remain frozen between sectors and cannot 
change permanently within sectors. For time series by sector, separating between-group 
effects from within-group effects is a standard feature of panel data ANOVA. Such 
effects are represented by the sum of squares of between-group variations SSB, and 
within-group variations, SSW, so that the total sum of squares, SST, is entirely 
decomposed into SSB + SSW, and the decomposition depends on the grouping criterion 
                                                 
14  Although there have been models of intermittent or endogenously fluctuating production on account of 
extreme economies of scale or coordination failures (e.g., hog cycles), the cyclical exposure of a 
manufacturing sector is not usually regarded as a structural supply-side characteristic of a sector. Like 
RZ (1998), we do not pursue the possibility that persistent overall characteristics of demand for the 
products of particular sectors, such as their durability, would be of structural/technological origin and 
linked to differences in RIFadjit or RIFRZi by sector from the product demand side. 
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used. Grouping by year of observation rather than sector, so that Group = Time(t), in 
part serves the diagnostic function of checking on the relative size of time-linked versus 
sector-linked structural differences and whether the latter dominate. Because if there 
were major breaks in RIFit during RZ’s 10-year or our 21-year observation period, 
focusing on its average values by sector over the entire period would be invalid. Given 
that structural breaks may well occur within sectors during lengthy periods, they should 
be allowed to reveal themselves.  
It is also useful from a macroeconomic standpoint to check whether any evidence 
on SSB(i)/SST(i) holds up when sectors are weighted by the highly unequal relative-
size factors, Wi, whose application is detailed in Appendix 3. In general, weighted 
regressions are used for two distinct purposes. One is to reduce measurement 
uncertainty. For instance, if the reliability of measurement instruments, or of “wit-
nesses” to events, is known to differ, weighting their readings by the inverse of their 
measurement error variance (divided by the sum of all such inverses) would be efficient 
to get the most accurate, minimum-variance measure. A second use is to reduce 
inference error that could arise without weighting if the importance of observations 
differed because the economic “mass” behind them was far from equal, and small and 
large sectors did not act alike. In the present application, weighting thus is used to check 
whether the tail, i.e., small industry sectors, would otherwise be wagging the dog.  
It turns out that weighting by a measure of the relative size of manufacturing-in-
dustry sectors ─ their share in the 1980-89 average annual expenditures on fixed capital 
assets in manufacturing ─ improves the representativeness of results by achieving out-
lier control of the light-weight sectors: The sum of squared deviations in the dependent 
variable, RIFadjit, falls by over 60 percent when weighting-factor Wi, normalized to wi, 
is applied. For any year t, the sum of these normalized weights is equal to the number of 
sectors, S = 21. Repeated T = 21 times, the sum of the weights on all observations thus 
is equal to their number (N), or to N = ST = 441. Because the sum of the weights wit 
then is the same as in the “unweighted” case where wi = 1 for all i at any t, “un-
weighted” and “weighted” results reported in Table 3 can be compared directly. 
When Group = Sector(i), decomposition into the underlying between-sector de-
viations and within-sector deviations is comparatively simple because the weights are 
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aligned with the grouping criterion. In that case, the S between-sector deviations of 





iii ∑∑∑−≡  (2)
where the last term is the weighted average of all observations. These deviations, which 
enter into the calculation of SSB(i), also are constructed for the independent variables 
used to explain sectoral differences in RIFadji in later regressions.  
Similarly, the total number of ST within-sector deviations of the annual data from 





iitit −=−≡ ∑∑  (3)
These types of deviations enter into the calculation of SSW(i) and are constructed also 
for independent variables used (together with time fixed (TFX) effects) in later regres-
sions attempting to explain within-sector variations in RIFadjit. When Group = Time(t) 
analogous definitions apply for BSXt and WSXti .  
3.2. Results, with and without weighting, for descriptive statistics and SST 
 The results in the first column of Table 3 show that between-sector effects, 
and not between-year effects, account for most of the SST in both decompositions. With 
or without use of the sectoral weighting variable Wi, SSB(i)/SST is in the 0.69-0.71 
range while SSB(t)/SST is 0.05-0.04.15 Because between-sector effects are based on 
sample- period averages, all between-year effects have to show up among within-sector 
variations, but the results suggest that total within-sector deviations in the cyclically-
adjusted data contain mostly idiosyncratic, and not common, temporal disturbances. For 
instance, referring to the “unweighted” results in Part A of Table 3, the TFX effect ac-
counts for only SSB(t)/SSW(i) = 52.68/386.10 = 0.04/0.291 = 13.7 percent of SSW(i).  
 SSB(i)/SST is also several times greater than SSB(t)/SST for all the explanatory 
variables deduced from constituents of RIFadj in the next section. These constituents, 
already shown in Table 3, are (1) the long-term average growth rate of the net stock of 
                                                 
15 Note that SST(i) = SST(t) = SST. 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics and Between-Groups to Total Sources of Variation: 
SSB/SST Equals R2 for the Respective Group Effects 
 
Glossary 
(Explanatory variables from GK to DELTA are defined on the next page.) 
SST: Total Sum of Squares = 440(St. Dev.)2. 
SSB: Amount of SST attributable to variation Between Groups. 
SSW: Amount of SST attributable to variation Within Groups.  
SSB/SST is identified as R2 in a variable’s one-way ANOVA that is produced by the fixed effects model 
specified without covariates. SST = SSB + SSW in that model with the breakdown depending on the 
choice of grouping criterion. 
 
* Weighting variable is the 1980-89 average annual CE shares by sector, with the 441 observations sorted 
first by i=1,…S, S=21 manufacturing-industry sectors when Group=Sector(i), and first by t=1,…T, T=21 
years when Group=Time(t). 
Variable: RIFadj GK NIP/PK II/GO DELTA 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  A.  Unweighted  































































































































fixed capital, GKit ; (2) net interest paid in relation to the current replacement cost of 
that stock of capital, (NIP/PK)it ; (3) the share of intermediate inputs in gross output, 
(II/GO)it ; and (4) the depreciation rate of the fixed stock of capital per sector, DELTAit. 
Table 3 also shows that weighting makes the greatest difference for RIFadjit. Its 
SST falls by more than 60 percent, from 1328.26 unweighted to 501.50 on a weighted 
basis, and SSB(i) falls by a similar percentage from 942.16 to 347.94. This signifies that 
the RIFadji values of the largest sectors tend to lie close together and have a much lower 
variance than for the smallest sectors. Investigating this clustering further, it turns out 
that the smallest three, i.e., one-seventh, of all sectors, with a combined weight of 1.9 
percent, accounted for 52.3 percent of SSB(i)=942.16 (col. 1, Table 3), while the largest 
three sectors, with a combined weight of 33.0 percent, accounted for only 0.3 percent of 
the same SSB(i) unweighted. Hence weighting by size of sector here makes a major 
difference to how much variation there is to explain. It is also noteworthy that the 




i =∑∑∑  is 
well below the simple average, .08.2 X =  Thus small sectors tend to have higher 
average values of RIFadj than large sectors in this database. 
4. Determinants of between- and within-sector differences in RIFadj 
Identification of the determinants of between-sector and within-sector variations 
in RIFadjit is essential preparation for deciding the extent to which sectoral differences in 
RIFadj are attributable to factors deemed structural/technological and to what extent 
these factors are persistent and universal. We look for such structural factors by 
considering those that would be expected to affect the cyclically-adjusted measure of 
RIF = CF/CE because they may differ characteristically by sector.  
4.1. Modeling non-cyclical determinants of RIFadjit 
In the derivation that follows, all amounts appearing in the numerator or 
denominator of RIF are scaled by PKK, the net stock of capital, K, valued at 
replacement cost by use of the price index, PK. CFit then is:   
CFit = {(1 – Zit)[ρit - (rit + πte)(Dit/PKitKit)] + δit}PKitKit or  
 20 
CFit = (ρit – nipit – zit + δit) PKitKit, where (4)
• ρit is the real net rate of return on all types of capital employed in sector i. 
Conceptually it needs to be adjusted by subtracting the rate of real capital gains 
expected on fixed assets, πKite – πite, so that the result equals the nominal net rate 
of return minus πKite. Monopoly profits per unit of capital, equal to θ-1(PQ/PKK)it 
as modeled, are included. 
• nipit, net interest paid on debt (Di) per unit of capital, is equal to  
(rit + πte)(Dit/PKitKit).  
• zit is the yield of taxes imposed at the rate Zit on business income net of interest 
paid, with the tax yield again expressed per unit of capital in sector i.  
• δit is the exponential-decay rate of economic depreciation of the net stock of capi-
tal. 
• πKite, πite, and πte are inflation rates expected on sector i’s stock of capital, its out-
put, and on total output, so that lenders to sector i set the nominal interest rate as 
(rit + πte). 
Turning to the denominator of RIFadjit, the standard decomposition of CEit is (a) 
into net investment that makes the real net stock of fixed capital grow at the rate gKit and 
(b) economic depreciation of that stock at the rate δit. CFit, conceptually and in fact, 
includes a return on working and intangible capital and not just on fixed capital. 
Although not implementable directly in the BEA industry-data source followed, at least 
the change in working capital, including inventories, expressed as the fraction Δinvit of 
PKiKi, thus should be added to CEit to account more fully for all the ─ in this case net ─ 
investments, normally positive, that need to be financed in growing sectors. 
CEit* = CEit + (Δinvit)PKitKit  = (gKit + δit + Δinvit) PKitKit . (5)
Using equations (4) and (5) yields the following representation of RIFadjit by compo-










Of these elements, only differences in tax-intensity per unit of capital, zit, are as-
sumed to have no sector-systematic effects because of offsetting movement in ρit: Sys-
tematic differences in net-of-depreciation after-tax returns on capital created by non-
neutralities of the business income tax system will not persist as they tend to be offset 
through tax shifting. Because there are differences in the extent to which firms in 
different sectors pay dividends, changes in the taxation of dividends could also be non-
neutral by sector.  However there are well-developed theories of invariance to dividend 
taxation for firms that use retentions, rather than equity issues, as a marginal source of 
funds and pay dividends with residual cash flow (Auerbach and Hassett, 2003).16  
4.2. Predicted effects of the explanatory variables 
Differences in individual components other than zit in equation (6) may not be 
neutralized, and their predicted ceteris paribus effects on RIFadjit are laid out next. 
• nipit. In theory, sectoral differences in leverage would have to affect the distribu-
tion of RIFadjit by sector. If the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, the form of fi-
nancing has no influence on the net (of depreciation) rate of return on invested 
capital required in any given business risk class. Then if more of that return is 
used for net interest payments going to bondholders and loan departments, less is 
left for stockholders. Hence if leverage differs systematically by sector for any 
reason, so should RIFadjit, with the relation with nipit expected to be negative. 
• δit. Predictions with regard to δit, the ratio of current-cost depreciation to the net 
stock of private fixed assets by industry sector, depend on the size of RIFadjit rela-
tive to 1. The reason is that δi appears in both numerator and denominator of 
RIFadjit. Hence if RIFadjit < 1 so that DEFadjit > 0 as RZ generally found with their 
data, a rise in the depreciation rate δi would be expected to raise the ratio RIFadjit 
ceteris paribus. However, since we find most often that RIFadjit > 1, the predomi-
nant effect of higher δit on RIFadjit is expected to be negative. 
• gKit. Unlike the level of the net stock of capital that scales both numerator and 
denominator of RIFadjit and thus cancels out, the real rate of growth of that stock, 
                                                 
16 Chetty and Saez (2005) and Auerbach and Hassett (2006) since have empirically rejected such 
invariance.     
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gKit, appears only in the denominator of equation (6). Hence, ceteris paribus, the 
expected relation between gKit and RIFadjit is negative. 
• Δinvit. This is net investment in working capital per unit of fixed capital assets in a 
sector. The only measure of RIFadjit that could be constructed from the BEA data is 
the measure constructed with denominator CEit which is normally less than CE*it 
because it omits Δinvit. The use of capital expenditures on fixed assets alone, CEit, 
understates the investment expenditures to be associated with the cash-flow return 
CFit the more, the greater is Δinvit. So a higher characteristic level of Δinvit, which 
is proxied by the ratio of intermediate inputs to gross output in a sector, (II/GO)it, 
is expected to raise the BEA-based RIFadjit above its true value. Now the omission 
of Δinvit from the denominator by itself may not matter greatly given that net 
inventory change in manufacturing over the period 1990-1997 was only 5 percent 
as large as investment in plant and equipment. While the real net stock of fixed 
capital in U.S. manufacturing has more than tripled (rising by a factor of 3.36) 
from 1977 to 1997, the real stock of inventories has only a little more than 
doubled (factor 2.28) over this period. However, there is a second factor that firms 
up expectations of a positive effect: By the end of the sample period in 1997, the 
net stock of inventories still was 28 percent as large as that of fixed capital assets 
and thus appreciable for the manufacturing sector as a whole. This percentage 
likely is greater the higher the value of II/GO per sector. Then the earnings 
required on capital committed to inventories will loom larger in the numerator, 
relative to investment in plant and equipment in the denominator, in any sector the 
more its establishments rely on intermediate inputs in relation to gross output. 
Hence both the implied addition to the numerator of RIFadjit and the reduction in 
its denominator point to a positive association with II/GOit.   
Overall, δit and (II/GO)it are the variables affecting RIFadjit that have the greatest 
claim to reflecting structural/technological features of manufacturing sectors. This holds 
in particular since the industrial classification is by establishment in the BEA “Industry” 
data source rather than by legal form of organization, as in Compustat. Establishments 
with a capital stock that is weighted toward equipment and software, rather than plant 
and structures, have high values of δi. Furthermore, in the BEA source, intermediate 
inputs used in a sector are defined input-output style as what is obtained from inside and 
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outside the sector in which the establishments are operating. Hence the ratio of the value 
of intermediate inputs to gross output, (II/GO)it, is indicative of efficient production 
organization within and between sectors and not a function of industrial ownership 
concentration having to do, for instance, with the degree of vertical integration within 
exchange-listed firms that are assigned to a particular sector in their entirety.  
5. Regression results  
To test the above conjectures empirically and to lay the groundwork for identifi-
cation and assessment of effects that merit being called structural/technological, we now 
run two types of regressions. These are based on the partition of all variables into their 
between-sector deviations, constructed as BSXi (equation (2)), and their within-sector 
deviations, constructed as WSXit (equation (3)). Estimates using the within-sector 
deviations are presented with and without the small TFX effects. Results are shown in 
Table 4, first with unweighted data and then when derived with the weighting variable.  
5.1. Actual effects on RIFadjit 
The findings below indicate the degree to which an industry sector’s reliance on 
internal finance may be related to particular, partly technology-driven, characteristics. 
GK (gKit). This variable captures the effect of differences in underlying growth 
rates of the real net stock of fixed capital (K) both between sectors, and within sectors 
over time. To guard against cyclical distortions, the capital stock values bracketing this 
calculation are set well apart and themselves stabilized by being given broad bases. This 
is done to capture sustained growth features of industry sectors. The two bases or pillars 
for calculating the average annual growth rates are centered at t-6 and t, so that GK is 
the average annual rate of growth of K over six years. But instead of taking the actual 
annual values of K at t-6 and t which may be affected by temporary disturbances, the 
normal value at those times is estimated as a geometric average of three years of 
observations centered on t-6 and t, respectively.17 Thus, only a third of the annual 
capital stock data used in the calculation of GK are replaced each year.  
                                                 
17  Hence the bases from and to which to calculate GK are constructed with net stocks of capital for years 
t-7 to t-5, and for years t-1 to t+1, reaching forward as far as 1998. Fortunately, the required chain-type 
quantity indexes for the net stock of private fixed assets are reported on the SIC87 basis through 2001. 
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Table 4.  Regression Results and Correlations, Without and With Weights,  
Group = Sector 
A. Results with all sectors weighted equally 
 
RIFadj – Between groups deviation of sectoral means from overall mean - OLS  
 GK NIP/PK II/GO DELTA R2 
Regression Coefficient -26.72 19.65 -6.50 27.14 0.587 
(t-value) or S (-1.60) (2.54) (-1.98) (1.11) 21 
 
RIFadj – Within groups deviation of data from respective sectoral mean - OLS  
Regression Coefficient -24.84 -3.41 -11.23 -8.64 0.277 
(t-value) or TS=N (-9.73) (-2.42) (-7.66) (-1.17) 441 
Previous with Time Fixed Effects 
Regression Coefficient -22.37 -4.67 -11.98 -22.91 0.333 
(t-value) or TS=N (-6.84) (-3.07) (-8.12) (-2.39) 441 
 
Correlation matrix: Lower diagonal, between groups; Upper, within groups 
 GK NIP/PK II/GO DELTA RIFadj 
      GK 1 -0.07 0.06 -0.35 -0.42 
      NIP/PK -0.30 1 -0.50 0.13 0.09 
      II/GO -0.23 -0.28 1 -0.15 -0.32 
      DELTA 0.44 -0.40 -0.33 1 0.14 
      RIFadj -0.25 0.61 -0.53 0.02 1 
 
B. Results with weighting variable Wi 
 
RIFadj – Between groups deviation of sectoral means from overall mean – OLS 
 GK NIP/PK II/GO DELTA R2 
Regression Coefficient -34.84 13.42 -3.71 46.81 0.315 
(t-value) or S (-2.33) (1.91) (-1.47) (2.16) 21 
 
RIFadj – Within groups deviation of data from respective sectoral mean – OLS 
Regression Coefficient -7.98 -2.49 -6.30 12.71 0.167 
(t-value) or TS=N (-4.34) (-1.99) (-5.86) (2.68) 441 
Previous with Time Fixed Effects 
Regression Coefficient -7.39 -2.71 -6.60 6.90 0.257 
(t-value) or TS=N (-3.27) (-2.09) (-6.14) (1.09) 441 
 
Correlation matrix: Lower diagonal, between groups; Upper, within groups 
 GK NIP/PK II/GO DELTA RIFadj 
      GK 1 -0.30 -0.23 0.44 -0.25 
      NIP/PK -0.37 1 -0.28 -0.40 0.61 
      II/GO -0.20 -0.29 1 -0.33 -0.53 
      DELTA 0.46 -0.42 -0.32 1 0.02 
      RIFadj -0.31 0.65 -0.53 -0.01 1 
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The resulting measure of GK bears the required negative relation to both the BSXi 
and WSXit components of RIFadjit. Differences in rates of growth of capital between 
sectors, on 21-year average, could well be due to like differences in profitability that 
were not only expected, but also realized in part, given the length of the sample period. 
To the extent some of this reverse causation has affected the industry averages to a 
degree that depends on each sector’s responsiveness and “time to build,” it may have 
reduced size and significance of the negative effect of GKi on RIFadji across sectors. 
Within sectors however, or from year to year, GKit may well rise reliably in expectation 
of higher future profits well down the road, particularly in new industries. Hence within 
sectors, the uni-directional or ceteris paribus effect of an increase in GKit lowering 
RIFadjit in equation (6) comes through most clearly. 
This negative relationship in the data for the United States spells conceptual 
trouble for RZ’s starting assumption according to which the level of domestic financial 
development (FD) determines which industries may be expected to grow more rapidly 
than captured by industry fixed effects for all countries. The problem posed for this 
theory by our finding a negative effect of GKit on RIFadjit (or positive effect on DEFadjit) 
with data for the United States is this: If the distribution of the BSXi (i.e., between-
sector) representation of RIFadji is shaped by the capital-stock growth rates of 
manufacturing industries in the United States in the 1980s, and these growth rates differ 
from those experienced by these same industries in other countries,18 as they must if 
theories of comparative advantage are to be brought to bear, the industry sectors that are 
growing fastest (after allowing for industry fixed effects) in other countries inevitably 
have higher U.S.-RIFadji (lower U.S.-DEFi) values assigned to them than the sectors that 
grow most rapidly in the United States. Then since almost all of these countries also are 
at lower levels of FD than the United States, RZ’s hypotheses about the structure of 
growth in different countries would appear to be validated essentially automatically. 
Hence the more pronounced the negative effect of GKi on RIFadji in the United States, 
the greater is the risk of Type II error. 
                                                 
18  Sustained differences in growth rates by sector within countries may be due to national, rather than 
global, factors, including differences in technology catch-up opportunities, incumbency effects, and 
national industrial policy. On the demand side, differences in sectoral income elasticities, and hence in 
sectoral growth rates, may be associated with large differences in per capita PPP-GDP even if 
countries have the same overall rates of growth 
 26 
It is still possible for RZ’s basic insight to be valid even if one of their joint as-
sumptions, which is that U.S.-RIFadjit applies equally to firms classified as belonging to 
the same industries in other countries, is dropped. For instance, the sector of Chemicals 
and Allied Products contained in the BEA source includes the subsector for Drugs and 
Medicines which RZ (1998, p. 576) find to be the most financially dependent industry 
in their set-up. From their regression results, they expect this sector to grow 2.4 
percentage points at an annual rate (compounded over 1980-90) faster in countries 
above than those below the median level of financial development. In this estimate, FD 
is represented by a, since discontinued, index of the quality of accounting standards. In 
the United States, the heterogeneous drugs and medicines sector includes biotech start-
ups at one end and (re)producers of generic drugs at the other. The former have 
enormous advance external financing needs and many years to go before generating 
positive cash flow or being merged, often in distress, into other companies. The generic 
drug makers’ path to positive cash flow is much shorter. In between these polar 
extremes from a cash-flow perspective are big-name drug MNEs in advanced countries 
which often pay substantial dividends and product-liability settlements and are cash-rich 
enough to engage in large stock buybacks to maintain leverage.  
Now the industry with the same classification in India in the 1980s may well have 
consisted mostly of firms manufacturing drugs under license as well as generics. Then 
that industry could grow equally rapidly in India and the United States. The reason 
would be that the segment that would be most prevalent in India would be far less 
dependent on external finance, and hence on a high level of FD, for its growth than the 
median firm classified as belonging to the same sector in the United States. Even though 
RZ would not find such an outcome consistent with inferences derived from all their 
assumptions holding jointly, such a rejection could imply a Type I error from a broader 
perspective that takes account of international differences in the internal composition of 
sectors. The upshot of this discussion relating to GKit is that neither acceptance nor 
rejection of the links to the sectoral structure of growth deduced from RZ’s U.S.-based 
measure and their conjectures about its properties might yield the correct message: Test 
results, irrespective their statistical significance, could be inconclusive. 
NIP/PK (nipit) . This variable, with and without the use of weighting variable Wi, 
has a positive effect on the BSXi representation, while having a negative effect in the 
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WSXit (i.e., within-sector) representation of RIFadjit. Between sectors, a high rate of net 
interest payments in relation to the current cost of the net stock of fixed capital thus 
does not appear to imply low cash flow after interest payments as the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem would have suggested. It is as if credit had been lavished on those fairly slow-
growing and relatively structure-intensive “old-line” (low δi) sectors with good cash 
flow that needed it least, except for the tax advantage of deducting net interest paid. The 
cross-correlation matrices in Table 4 strongly support this interpretation, especially for 
weighted data. In highly leveraged oligopolistic sectors, cash flow may be high but 
growth opportunities low − with leverage perhaps maintained at high levels through a 
program of special dividend distributions and stock buybacks. In that case the ratio 
variable RIFadjit could remain relatively high even after substantial interest payments by 
such sectors. Indeed, companies that earn a normal rate of return on invested assets but 
are not growing have to pay out their net (of depreciation and taxes) return in the form 
of interest and dividends unless they want to become net portfolio investors. Because 
dividends, as a use of cash flow, are included in CF, the RIFadjit values of dividend-
paying companies with non-negative retained earnings making only replacement in-
vestments (only δit appears in the denominator of equation (6)) are bound to be above 1. 
However, a rise in the interest burden within a sector could well be due to rating 
downgrades and liquidity problems affecting producers in a sector as their debt issues 
and interest rates on borrowing rise. Such a rise would be associated with a reduction in 
cash flow net of interest payments and hence of RIFadjit. Indeed, “pecking-order” models 
of financial structure long have described reliance on debt as a measure of last resort in 
a funding pinch when there is strong aversion to dilution of control through additional 
equity finance. This shows that the decomposition of variables into BSXi and WSXit 
deviations may have succeeded to some degree in separating equilibrium 
differentiations across sectors from within-sector disequilibrium effects of changes in 
the explanatory variable NIP/PK. 
II/GO (for Δinvit). As for DELTA, the highlighted ratios of (SSB/SST)i in Table 3 
show that 80 percent or more of the total variation (sum of squared deviations) in this 
variable is due to between-sector, rather than within-sector, variations, thereby giving 
this variable a strong claim to being structural. The finding on this variable in Table 4 is 
that the higher the ratio of intermediate inputs in gross output, the lower is RIFadjit, more 
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significantly in the WSXit than the BSXi representation. Our prior on the  
sign of the between-sector effect had pointed in the other direction. Pairwise correlation 
coefficients in Table 4 show that sectors with a high ratio of intermediate inputs in gross 
output grow more slowly, use less leverage, and have lower depreciation rates and 
poorer cash flow than sectors characterized by low II/GO. Within a sector, II/GO may 
well rise because the relative price of the value added by establishments in that sector 
has declined, because these establishments have been shedding functions on account of 
inefficiency and outsourcing, or for other reasons associated with a decline in RIFadjit. 
Hence a within-sector disequilibrium effect that is negative significant, as was found, 
may again be reasonable, but a negative between-sector effect was not expected. 
DELTA (δit). The depreciation rate in a sector is another variable that may be 
deemed structural/technological. The expected effect of this variable is negative when 
RIFadjit is greater than 1, as holds on period-average in 18 out of the 21 sectors. Instead 
it is found to be positive significant according to the weighted results in part B of Table 
4 although there are mixed and statistically insignificant signs on the unweighted results 
in Part A. High values of DELTA characterize high-tech companies intensively using 
equipment and software subject to rapid obsolescence. To the extent high-tech compa-
nies are also highly risky, they may have to depend on equity and venture-capital fund-
ing, rather than debt finance, at least in the start-up phase. But the surviving companies 
do not appear to display a high degree of dependence on this or any other external 
source of funds: In all, high values of DELTA are positively associated with high values 
of GK and low values of NIP/PK, but the pairwise correlation of DELTA with RIFadjit is 
around zero. The omission of investment in intangible assets (see Hall, 2001, and 
Cochrane, 2005, p. 74) from the denominator of RIFadjit could cause an upward 
measurement bias that is most severe in the high-tech, high-DELTA sectors, thereby 
masking the negative relation between DELTA and RIFadjit otherwise expected. 
According to a BEA (2006) study, for the economy as a whole, if R&D were included 
in the GDP as investment instead of as an expense, business investment would be 11 
percent higher (in the last year of the study, 2002). But the effect in individual 
manufacturing sectors could be much larger. 
In sum, there is some disappointment about the unexpected direction of between-
sector effects on RIFadjit found for the variables II/GO and DELTA. These variables are 
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most likely to represent fairly deep and universal characteristics of efficient production 
organization by establishment and of the most appropriate technology embodied in the 
composition of the stock of capital by sector. The results on GK and NIP/PK provide 
keener insights into the direction of effects, yet these variables relate specifically to U.S. 
growth and leverage patterns by sector. The fairly robust and consistently negative ef-
fect of GK on RIFadj found in Table 4, especially within sectors, and irrespective of 
weighting, was strongly expected. Crediting GKi with being one of the fundamental 
factors underlying sectoral differences in RIFadji in the United States would disqualify 
its RIFadji from being universally applicable if a new theory of comparative advantage, 
attempting to explain international differences in growth rates by sector upon opening 
up, is intended. The effects of (NIP/PK)it on RIFadjit being positive between, and 
negative within sectors, and the negative effect of (II/GO)it within sectors hinted that 
characteristic differences in long-run average values, construed as “equilibrium” 
differences in explanatory variable levels between sectors, and year-to-year changes in 
these levels within sectors can have quite different effects: Structures, or structural 
strengths and weaknesses, may be changing. Some of this distinctiveness can be 
captured by the decomposition technique here employed. 
6. Interpretation of results and conclusion 
Domestic financial development by itself and through its correlates, such as the 
general level of education, legal and institutional development, and technological so-
phistication, disproportionately benefits entities that make the greatest use of these 
national assets for production support.19 So much is true without a doubt. Now such 
entities validly could be grouped by SIC manufacturing sector if the degree of 
dependence on external finance of these entities differed fundamentally by sector. 
Granting this just to proceed to a conclusion whose internal consistency is compelling, 
the next two assumptions are that local finance matters for economic growth and its 
importance by manufacturing sector is the same all over the world regardless of whether 
countries are open or closed to FDI and other capital inflows. If all this is so, it follows 
                                                 
19  Wood (1995), for instance, showed the development of skills and analytical capabilities to be a key 
determinant of comparative advantage and manufacturing export performance. 
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necessarily that the level of domestic financial development helps determine the open-
economy pattern of international specialization in manufacturing.  
Any remaining logical problems then have to do only with differences between 
dynamic and comparative-static predictions. If developing countries open up to 
international trade and finance simultaneously, suppose that financial development 
grows most in countries with the lowest levels of FD, so that there is some international 
convergence in levels of FD. Then the expected effect of such joint liberalization on the 
sectoral structure of growth in manufacturing is unclear. The reason is that the dynamic 
Rybczynski effect of increasing the factor “finance” in those countries may trump the 
comparative-static effect of increased specialization in trade in sectors of their 
comparative advantage. These sectors are characterized by low values of DEF on 
account of the low level of FD, yet this comparative advantage, or the disadvantage in 
finance, is diminishing because FD is rising rapidly. Setting aside this difficulty by 
holding the level of FD, or relevant differences in FD between countries, constant, 
makes the internal logic of RZ’s argument, granting its assumptions, unassailable.  
The key questions examined in this paper relate to the validity of some of these 
assumptions. These are crucial for the construction of the test measure and the 
interpretation of its properties. We thus examined whether the manufacturing-industry 
sectors that stand to benefit most from opening up to trade in different countries could 
safely be predicted by using only data for their levels of FD and relying on U.S. firm 
data on DEF for all the rest. Confidence in the use of such a procedure to predict the 
structure of growth in different countries would be enhanced first if the data generated 
for the United States would also be macroeconomically representative for it. Yet 
agreement between the Compustat-based median-firm data of RZ and our BEA-based 
data for all establishments in a sector was found to be small. Secondly, confidence 
would be enhanced if structural/technological reasons for sectoral differences in RZ’s 
DEFi, or the present RIFadjit, could reliably be identified and judged to be intrinsic to 
these sectors.  
 Table 5 summarizes our results on identification. RZ attribute all structural/tech-
nological differences to unchanging between-sector effects by relying solely on one 
measure per sector obtained with decadal averaging. They then took the between-sector  
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Table 5.  Percentage Decomposition of the Sum of Squares (SST)  




 [1] [2] 
 
Between-groups effects, group = sector 
   








Within-groups effects, group = sector 
   







   
Total  100 100 
 
Note:  The source statements below identify entries in the table above by row followed by [col-
umn] number. The methodology used to separate within-group from between-group effects 
when sectors are unweighted (weighted equally) or weighted (weighted unequally) is explained 
in Appendix 3. 
 
Sources 
1[1] and 1[2]: Table 3, column 1.  The entries in 4[1] and 4[2] are the complements (from 100). 
2[1] and 2[2]: Product of (a) R2 of 0.587 (unweighted) or 0.315 (weighted) shown in last column of 
Table 4 for regressions of deviations between sectoral and overall means and (b) the 
entries in 1[1] and 1[2], respectively. The entries in 3[1] and 3[2] contain the 
unidentified remainder of the total between-sector effects.  
5[1] and 5[2]: Product of (a) R2 of 0.333 (unweighted) or 0.257 (weighted) shown in last column of 
Table 4 for regressions with Time Fixed Effects of deviations of cyclically-adjusted 
RIF data from their respective sectoral means and (b) the entries in 4[1] and 4[2], 
respectively. The entries in 6[1] and 6[2] contain the unidentified remainder of the total 
within-sector effects.  
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effects found with U.S. data for the median firm by sector to be structural/technological 
within the United States and, as they further assumed, elsewhere. We examined whether 
we can substantiate the latter assumption just for the United States, on the data of which 
it was founded, by trying to attribute between-sector effects to some of the variables 
prominently involved in the construction of RIFadj. As inferred from columns [1] and [2] 
in the top part of Table 5, BSXi values of those variables are able to explain 59 percent 
(41.6/70.9) of the between-groups effects in RIFadj unweighted, but this percentage 
drops to 32 percent (21.9/69.4) when weighting by the relative size of investment (CEi) 
by sector. Hence up to two-thirds of the between-sector variation remains unexplained. 
Furthermore, what is explained, in particular by sectoral differences in the average rate 
of growth of the stock of capital, GKi, itself, can not all be credited with being 
structural/technological, let alone universal. Nor were the signs found on more 
structural/technological variables like (II/GO)i and DELTAi consistently convincing.  
 To conclude, variables that can be viewed as likely candidates for structural dif-
ferences between sectors fail to explain much of the variability in RIFadjit. This failure 
occurs despite the fact that RIFit, as a measure constructed from data for all establish-
ments contributing to activity in any sector, is bound to be more representative of con-
ditions in that sector than measures based on sector medians by exchange-listed firm. 
Grouping manufacturing entities by the industrial classification of the sector in which 
they operate is not likely to yield a sectoral distribution by dependence on external 
finance that is firmly held in place by factors that are recognizably fundamental. Hence 
it is difficult to maintain the assumption that the DEFi or RIFadji measures calculated for 
the United States have information for the structure of growth in other countries via the 
nexus between sectors’ financial dependence as revealed by U.S. DEFi and each 
country’s level of financial development. 
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Appendices:    NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
Appendix 1.  Short-Run Determinants of Output Used for Cyclical Adjustment 
 
Overview 
A monetary approach is used both to represent economy-wide aggregate-demand, or 
LM, disturbances and to anchor price expectations. These depend on a preset target 
level of the money supply, M, and enter into forward-looking wage contracts. The labor 
market clears ex ante as the nominal wage rate has been set in advance on the basis of 
rational expectations (consistent with expected fulfillment of the relevant first-order 
condition) for homogeneous labor employed in a competitive labor market. Ex post, 
however, aggregate manufacturing employment and output, and their breakdown by 
sector, deviate from expected levels. Temporary deviations from trend of two relative 
prices also influence sectoral output levels. This appendix then shows in several steps 
that the unexpected rate of deviation (D) from trend of an industry sector’s output at 
time t is:  
 
Dln(Qit) = (1-βi)-1[αi si (DlnLmt) - αi (θ-1)Dln(PGOit/PGOmt) – βi Dln(PIIit/PVAit)], (A1)
where PGOit/PGOmt is the price index of the sector’s Gross Output relative to that of the 
entire manufacturing sector, and  PIIit /PVAit is the price index of the Intermediate In-
puts used in sector i relative to the price index of its Value Added. Any deviation of si 
from its model value 1 indicates whether the cyclical sensitivity of demand for an in-
dustry sector’s output is above or below average. Conceptually, the deviations of output 
from trend are linked to deviations in cash flow and RIF. Yet when cash flow (CF) in a 
sector responds to the short-run deviations identified in equation (A1), capital expendi-
ture on fixed assets (CE) in that sector will show some of the same short-run sensitivity, 
albeit ─ on account of pre-commitment to lengthy investment projects ─ usually less. 
Hence the equation used for adjusting RIFit uses the same explanatory variables as 
equation (A1). 
Three-Factor Production Function 
A CD production function Fi(Ki, Ji, Li) is adopted for industry sector i, where i, shown 
either as a subscript or in parentheses to optimize legibility, ranges over a unit interval 
from 0 to n=1. The goods and services inputs in that function are a beginning-of-period 
capital stock, Ki, of fixed assets and (raw, intermediate, work in progress, and finished-
goods) inventories, as well as purchased inputs here called “intermediates,” Ji, and la-
bor, Li. In the model, labor is homogeneous and the labor market competitive so that all 
workers earn the same nominal wage, W. Then with total factor productivity scalar Ai 
and with fixed input elasticities of output with respect to labor and intermediates, α(i) 
and β(i),  the gross output of sector i at factor cost (excluding indirect taxes) is: 
 
Qi = Ai Fi(Ki, Ji, Li) = Ai Ki 1–α(i)-β(i) Ji β(i) Liα(i). (A2)
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Dixit-Stiglitz Aggregation and its Limiting Features  









⎡∫ ,  θ >> 1,  (A3)
where the elasticity of substitution between any two products, θ, is required to be 
greater than 1 -- usually much greater.20 The corresponding aggregate for the price 









⎡∫ ,  
 
(A4)
and Dixit-Stiglitz demand for product i is an inverse function of its price, Pi, relative to 






⎡ .  (A5)
Adopting the Dixit-Stiglitz consistent aggregation scheme for model specification and 
coefficient identification poses certain difficulties for empirical work: 
 
• Although both gross output and value added are reported by industry sector in the 
source followed, the factor incomes reported there, including gross returns to 
capital, refer, of course, to value-added in each sector. By contrast, the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregate refers to gross final output by sector that may contain inputs 
from other sectors. 
• The imposition of identical elasticities of substitution of θ between the final sales 
of all industry sectors, coupled with unitary income elasticities of demand, may 
lead to over-determination in certain applications. Furthermore, equating the elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption with the price elasticity of demand facing 
producers would imply that there is only one producer per variety.  
• The Dixit-Stiglitz model implies that relative prices are determined by supply 
conditions while preferences are given. Hence, as shown by equation (A5), an in-
crease in relative price always leads to some decrease in the relative quantity de-
manded and is not due to a shift in demand toward a sector’s output.  
• That equation also implies that any changes in aggregate demand that affect Q will 
change Qi by the same percentage even though the cyclical sensitivity of demand 
is likely to differ by industry sector (and must be allowed to differ to avoid over-
determination of the i equations of type (A12) estimated in the paper).  
 
                                                 
20  McCallum (2001, p. 149) settles on a value of 5. See Bennett T. McCallum, “Monetary Policy Analy-
sis in Models without Money,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August: 145-160. 
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Model Disturbances and Assumptions 
In long-run equilibrium, the rate of return on capital in any sector should be equal to the 
cost of capital required in the business- and market-risk class for that sector. In the short 
run, however, there are identifiable surprises that may affect cash flow and capital ex-
penditures unequally so that their ratio, RIF = 1 - DEF, is affected. The short-run is here 
defined as the length of a business-cycle. The types of shocks considered that can have 
an effect on RIF in the short run are: 
 
• An aggregate demand shock that is interpreted as a shock to the GDP-transactions 
velocity of money, ev, where v ~ N(0, σv2), so that the shock process is stationary 
with 0 mean and the actual value of V is given as V = evVe. Expected values are 
characterized throughout by the superscript e, while ev ≡ exp(v). While a shock 
v>0 would be expected to lower interest rates and expand the economy in the short 
run, it would affect only the price level in the long run. Monetary policy is taken 
to refrain from attempting to fine-tune the economy and not to react immediately 
to current shocks to aggregate demand. Hence any cyclical instability observed in 
the economy can be attributed, for simplicity, to fluctuations in v that have not yet 
given rise to monetary-policy feedback. 
 
• There are three relative prices in the model that may be subject to disturbances: 
 
(a) the relative price of intermediate inputs used in sector i, PJi/Pi  (written PIIi/Pi in the 
text), 
(b)  the relative price of industry sector i’s output (or value added) relative to the price 
index for manufacturing as a whole, Pi/P,  
(c)  the relative price of fixed capital goods inputs used in sector i, PKi/Pi. 
 
The first two are subject to relative-price shocks in the short run. Such shocks will be 
identified simply by deviations in the logarithms of the respective explanatory variables 
from their trend values. For specific industry sectors, changes in relative input prices, 
identified under (a), may indicate productivity shocks and other supply disturbances. 
Changes in relative output prices (b) may reflect industry-specific demand factors in the 
short run and supply factors in both the short and the long run. Since the stock of fixed 
capital is taken as given in the short run as noted below, unexpected changes in the 
relative price of fixed capital inputs (c) do not affect the factor composition used in the 
short run. 
 
Three basic modeling assumptions distinguish the short run from the long run: 
 
1. In the short run, the beginning-of-period stock of capital whose services are used 
for this period’s production is treated as a constant even though capital expendi-
tures occur during the current period. Hence, unlike Ji and Li, Ki is predetermined 
in the short-run, but not of course in the long-run analysis. 
 
2. In the short run, the desired level of employment, Li*, as opposed to the actual 
level of employment during the contract period, Li, is treated as constant while in 
the long run Li* changes (commonly grows). The modeling below also makes no 
allowances for changes in multifactor productivity, Ai, in the short-run, although 
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differential rates of multifactor productivity growth are among the factors that can 
contribute to changes in Pi/P even in the short run.  
 
3. The nominal wage rate, W, equal to the expected marginal revenue (MR) product, 
is agreed upon in advance of the contract period on the basis of expectations (su-
perscript e) about economy-wide productivity (A) and price-level developments 
(P) during that period (of one year). Beyond that timeframe, labor compensation 
rates are flexible and always set so that the labor market would clear ex ante at the 
intersection of labor demand and supply and yield the desired employment level of 
L*, that was determined in advance, if everything evolved as expected.  
 
Aggregate Demand Shocks to Industry-Sector Employment 
Aggregate demand is related in rudimentary fashion to real money balances M/P and to 
the demand for real balances that is inversely related to velocity, V. The nominal money 
supply, M, is exogenous while V is subject to spontaneous disturbances: 
 
Q = AF(K, J, L) = V(M/P) , where V = evVe, v ~ N(0,σv2). (A6)
The nominal wage rate that had been set in advance on the basis of rational expectations 
(consistent with expected fulfillment of the relevant first-order condition) for homoge-
neous labor employed in a competitive labor market is: 
 
W = α[(θ -1)/θ]Pie(Aie)F(Ki, Jie, Li*)/Li*,   (A7)
where (θ -1)/θ  = (MRe/Pe) from equation (A5). This equation holds equally for total 
manufacturing in the aggregate so that:  
 
W = α[(θ -1)/θ]Pe(Ae)F(K, Je, L*)/L*.   (A7a)
Taking expectations of equation (A6) assuming the level of M planned for the next pe-
riod is already known, using the result to substitute the point estimate VeM/Qe for Pe in 
equation (7a), and then canceling Qe = AeF(K, Je, L*) yields the wage-determination 
equation: 
 
W = α[(θ-1)/θ]VeM/L*. (A7b)
The corresponding expected aggregate income shares are as follows: 
 
1. The expected share of labor is WL*/PeQe = α[(θ -1)/θ]. 
2. Analogously, the expected share of intermediates is (PI/P)e(Je/Qe) = β[(θ -1)/θ]. 
3. Hence if the expected share of capital is (1- α - β) [(θ -1)/θ], there is a fraction θ-1 
 still to be accounted for if the shares are to sum to 1 
4. The monopolistic-competition component in the price, (Pe – MRe)/ Pe = θ-1 is 
statistically part of the return on capital and hence of cash flow. Conceptually, in 
the present framework, this component of the return is used to defray amortization 
of entry or franchise costs through the equivalent of an annual surcharge on value-
added of  (Pe – MRe)/ MRe = (θ-1)-1. 
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When the gross monopolistic mark-up over marginal costs is μ = θ/(θ-1), the net mark-
up is μ – 1 = (θ-1)-1, while the net mark-up as a share of the price per unit of sector i’s 
output is θ-1. Hence the total return credited to capital, including the monopolistic com-
ponent used for the amortization of a fixed amount of “franchise” capital not included in 
accounting measures of the stock of capital or of capital expenditures is:   
 
(1- α - β) [(θ -1)/θ] + θ-1 = 1 - (1- θ-1)(α + β). (A8)
With W set, actual industry-sector employment, Li, is demand-determined and thus 
given by the first-order condition: 
 
W = α[(θ-1)/θ] (Pi/P)P AiF(Ki, Ji, Li)/Li . (A9)
Using equations (A2), (A6) and then (A5) to substitute for P and Qi/Q, equation (A9) 
reduces to: 
 
W= α[(θ-1)/θ] (Pi/P)1-θevVeM /Li . (A9a)
Hence, combining equations (A7b) and (A9a) and normalizing L* at 1 yields:  
 
Li = ev(Pi/P)1-θ , (A10)
or, taking logarithms and then deviations (D) from trend over time, t, 
 
Dln(Lit) = vt + (1-θ)Dln(Pit/Pt). (A10a)
Equation (A10a) shows that deviations in a sector’s employment from trend are driven 
by aggregate demand disturbances, represented by velocity shocks, v, and by deviations 
from trend in the relative price of industry sector i’s output, Pi/P, where (1-θ)<0. 
The result, that the unexpected rate of deviation of velocity from Ve is equal to the un-
expected rate of deviation in aggregate employment, L, from L* is explained by P ris-
ing, and the real wage falling, at the rate (1-α)v, given that W is preset. Hence labor 
input rises at the rate v (equation (A10)) and Q increase at the rate αv (equation (A2)), 
so that nominal output, PQ, rises at the rate (1-α)v + αv = v as required by equation 
(A6) after substituting evVe for V. 
 
Because shocks to the relative price of intermediates and to the level of total factor pro-
ductivity do not affect optimal employment in this simple model, aggregate demand 
shocks alone determine deviations of aggregate employment from the initially expected 
and desired level. The reasons for this independence are easy to explain:  
 
(a) A uniform upward shock to the relative price of intermediate inputs (obtained 
from outside the manufacturing sector) in all manufacturing sectors lowers the 
marginal product of labor by the same rate by which it raises the price of output, 
P. Given W, the marginal product of labor and the real wage thus decline by the 
same amount at a given level of L. Hence there is no change in the quantity of la-
bor demanded in the short run for which the money wage rate was preset, with la-
bor committed to supply the amount employers wish to hire at that value of W. 
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(b) A uniform unanticipated rise in multifactor productivity raises the marginal prod-
uct of labor at the same rate by which it lowers the price level at a given level of 
L. Hence the real wage rises at the same rate as the marginal product of labor, 
leaving no change in the amount of labor demanded in the short run. 
 
Intermediates, Output, and Supply Disturbances 
Having obtained equation (A10) to determine Li , we next have to find the amount of 
intermediates, Ji, used in production by manufacturing sector i for given Ki and relative 
price PJi/Pi from the first-order condition:  
 
PJi/Pi = βiAi(Ki1 - α(i) - β(i) Ji β(i) - 1 Liα(i)).  
The solution for Ji is: 
 
Ji =  [βi(Pi/PJi)AiKi1 - α(i) - β(i) Liα(i)]1/(1-β(i)). (A11)
The solutions for Li and Ji from equations (A10) and (A11), in conjunction with the pre-
given levels of Ki and Ai and with the aggregate demand shock v and relative prices 
PJi/Pi and Pi/P thus allow Qi to be determined from equation (A2) as subject to unex-
pected change in the short run solely in v, Pi/P and PJi/Pi. Taking the logarithm of the 
resulting expression for Qi and then the relative differences of all variables from their 
trend values (or from their stationary value, as with Ve) yields: 
 
Dln(Qit) = (1-βi)-1[αi(si vt) – αi(θ-1)Dln(Pit/Pt) – βiDln(PJit/Pit], (A12)
where any deviation of si from the value of 1 in this model (or more than 1 according to 
Okun’s Law) allows for the demand for an industry sector’s output to be of above-aver-
age or below-average cyclicality (equation (A5) imposes the same sensitivity on all 
sectors). Solving equation (A10a) for the entire manufacturing sector allows replacing vt 
in equation (A12) by Dln(Lt), the rate of deviation in employment in manufacturing 
from trend. Furthermore, the price index of a sector’s intermediate inputs, PJi ≡ PIIi , en-
ters into the price index of its gross output, Pi, but not into the price index of its value 
added, PVAi. To prevent joint effects from input price shocks on both the numerator 
and denominator, Dln(PIIit/PVAit) was substituted for Dln(PJit/Pit) in equation (A1) to 
obtain better resolution in the equations for cyclical adjustment reported in the text. 
 
Equations (A1) thus shows that an industry sector’s output may be disturbed in the short 
run by the macroeconomic analogue of income (aggregate demand) and price (aggre-
gate supply) disturbances, specifically by: 
 
• aggregate demand shocks that raise total manufacturing employment above trend 
if positive (dlnL>0) with a model coefficient that is identified as si-times a fraction 
that is equal to the share of labor over the share of value added in gross output, 
αi/(1-βi) < 1. 
• deviations in the relative supply price of the sector’s output from trend that, if 
positive, lower Qi on account of their adverse effects on the quantity demanded 
with a model coefficient greater than absolute 1 on account of θ>>1, and 
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• deviations from trend in the supply price of intermediate inputs relative to value 
added, that, if positive, also lower Qi because margins become squeezed when the 
relative price of materials inputs increases. The absolute value of the model coef-
ficient on this term is greater than 1 if the share of value added is less than one-
half and hence the share of intermediate inputs, βi, greater than half. 
 
The Cyclical Adjustment of RIFit   
The estimating equation derived from equation (A1), which is equation (1) in the text, 
displays all the advantages of rigorous modeling in that it fully identifies the coeffi-
cients of the reduced form with structural parameters from the production and demand 
functions specified earlier. Yet the modeling is much too uniform to do justice to condi-
tions in each sector. First, since corporate profits tend to lead and corporate investment 
and employment tend to lag the business cycle, RIF might show countercyclical tenden-
cies in some sectors relative to employment deviations from trend in total manufactur-
ing. For instance, when employment and investment in manufacturing are still unduly 
depressed in the early stages of “jobless recoveries,” profits and cash flow may already 
have recovered nicely well before investment. Hence RIFit could be higher in the early 
than in the late stages of recoveries in some sectors.  
 
In addition, the Dixit-Stiglitz specification, while providing modeling discipline, tracta-
bility, and coefficient identification, unrealistically limits the set of product-market dis-
turbances to those stemming from the supply side. If instead of figuratively just moving 
along negatively sloped (factor and product) demand curves, demand, and not supply, is 
actively disturbed in a sector, expected signs would change. For instance, if the demand 
for the finished goods of a sector making heavy use of intermediate inputs (II or J) that 
are in inelastic supply increases, so may Dln(PIIit/PVAit) and RIFit. A shift in final de-
mand towards a sector’s gross output may also raise Dln(PGOit/PGOmt), the price index 
of its gross output relative to that of total manufacturing (m) at time t, and again raise 
RIFit, and not lower it as equation (A5) instead would predict.  
 
Hence in adjusting the RIFit data, separately for each sector, for their particular “cycli-
cal” income and price effects, acceptable coefficients are distributed over a broader 
range than that admitted by the model with unchanging preferences and uniform pa-
rameters. Indeed, some positive and some negative significant values are found among 
each of the three regression coefficients in separate estimates for each of the i =1,…21 
sectors over t = 1,…21 years. Accepting all this, the cyclically-adjusted data, RIFadjit, 
are the solution for RIFit that is obtained from equation (1) in the text after setting all 
three temporary deviations (D…, in bold letters) to zero. 
 
Appendix 2.  Data Sources, Industry Classifications, and the Construction of RIF, 
DEF, and of Explanatory Variables for the 21 Manufacturing-INDUSTRY Sectors 
 
I. Data Sources and Construction  
 
I.A.  BEA Data Sources 
 
The homepage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, http://www.bea.gov, provides four main selections of U.S. Economic Ac-
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counts, among them National and Industry. There are 21 manufacturing sectors, identi-
fied in Tables A1 and A2 of this appendix, for which data are reported in some of the 
tables in each of these two main databases and in a supplementary database, FAWeb. 
The tables used to obtain data on gross fixed capital formation and to construct cash 
flow in all 21 sectors are identified below. These data are used to construct the depend-
ent variables RIF and DEF, where RIF = 1 - DEF. Additional, explanatory, variables are 
obtained from these databases first to construct values of cash flow by industry sector 
that are free of temporary or cyclical disturbances affecting that sector and secondly to 
explain time-series cross-section differences in the ratio of this adjusted cash flow 
measure to gross fixed capital formation by industry. That ratio represents the degree of 
reliance on internal finance, RIF, and it is adjusted for temporary disturbances to obtain 
the equilibrium measure, RIFadj, whose differences by industry sector and over time are 
subject to panel analysis. Names used in the body of the paper either for variables serv-
ing to adjust RIF for temporary deviations or to help explain systematic differences in 
the adjusted values of RIF, RIFadj, by industry sector are highlighted in what follows to 
facilitate looking up their derivation. The operator + is used in the click sequences be-
low to indicate the items selected from successive menus of the three databases to reach 
the data used in this study. 
 
(1) NIPAWEB National (http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp) + Gross 
Domestic Product + Interactive NIPA Tables + List of All NIPA Tables. Tables 
6.17B (through 1987) and 6.17C (from 1987): Corporate Profits Before Tax by 
Industry, and Tables 6.18B and 6.18C: Taxes on Corporate Income by Industry. 
 
(2)  INDUSTRY (http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn2/gdpbyind_data.htm) + GDP by Indus-
try + Interactive Tables + GDP-by-Industry Data 1947-1997 + Historic SIC Data 
+ GDPbyIND_VA_SIC (open XLS) + tab 72SIC_Components_of_VA (value-
added data for 1947-1987 on 1972 SIC basis) or tab 87SIC_Components_of_VA 
(value-added data for 1987-1997 on 1987 SIC basis; data on this basis are not 
available beyond 1997).  
 
Unlike in NIPAWeb above, value-added and its components are not attributed simply to 
the pre-dominant SIC classification of the corporation that produced them but imputed 
to the line of business of each of the corporation’s or proprietor’s establishments in the 
GDP-by-Industry database followed. Hence there is no disagreement between the cash 
flow data derived from this database and the data on gross fixed capital formation, taken 
from FAweb, which are also reported on an establishment basis as noted below.  
 
Data on gross output (GO), intermediate inputs (II) and value-added (VA) totals are also 
available from this source from worksheets 72SIC_VA,GO,II and 87SIC_VA,GO,II 
together with the respective chain-type price and quantity indexes. Details are given in 
the Section I.B. 
 
(3) FAWEB http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/FAweb/Index2002.htm + Standard Fixed 
Assets Tables + Section 3: Private Fixed Assets by Industry + Table 3.7ES: His-
torical Cost Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry. 
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BEA staff (Michael D. Glenn and David B. Wasshausen) directed us to this site, not 
identified on the BEA public website menu. It has time-series data (last revised Sep-
tember 25, 2002) for 1947-2001, consistently presented in the 1987 SIC format, for 
Historical-Cost Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry on an establishment ba-
sis.  This variable, known as capital expenditures, CE, constitutes the denominator of 
RIF.  
 
The distribution of CE is also used to construct weights reflecting the relative impor-
tance of industry sectors. The annual share of each sector’s CE in the combined total for 
all 21 sectors, averaged over 10 years, 1980-89, yields the weighting variable Wi. 
 
Additional Tables used from FAWEB (2002) to explain variations in RIFadj are: 
 
(a) Table 3.1ES Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry 
(b) Table 3.2ES Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets 
by Industry 
(c)  Table 3.4ES Current-Cost Depreciation of Fixed Assets by Industry. 
 
The ratio (c)/(a) provides estimates of the underlying depreciation rate by industry sec-
tor (DELTA). Section I.F(a) explains why use of these current-cost data yields the 
proper “economic” measure of the depreciation rate. Calculating the appropriate under-
lying rate of growth of the net stock of capital is more complicated because this rate is 
more variable, both cyclically and structurally. To deal with both of these issues, we 
used the geometric average of the index values in (b) for three successive years, t-1 
through t+1 (centered on t), divided by the geometric average of t-5 to t-7 (centered on 
t-6) index values, with the resulting ratio of geometric means taken to the power 1/6, to 
obtain our estimate of the underlying annual average rate of growth of capital (GK) 
leading up to a time period centered on time t. Thus, only a third of the data used in the 
construction of this underlying growth rate are updated each year. 
 
The data in (a) are used as denominator of the explanatory variable NIP/PK. Its nu-
merator, NIP, consists of Corporate and Noncorporate Net Interest and Miscellaneous 
Payments that are among the components of VA in the INDUSTRY database. The SIC 
conversion factors from the SIC72 to the SIC87 basis described at the end of this sec-
tion were applied to the data before 1987 for this component before dividing by the Cur-
rent-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry, PK. 
 
SIC Conversion Factors. The components of value added by industry up to and includ-
ing 1987 (overlap year), and hence cash flow by industry, are available only on the 1972 
SIC (establishment) basis as explained under INDUSTRY above. To achieve compati-
bility with the fixed-investment data by SIC87 industry sector, cash-flow data prior to 
1987 were converted by applying conversion factors to industry sectors equal to the 
ratio of cash flow reported by SIC87 sector to cash flow reported by the comparable or 
identical SIC72 manufacturing-industry sector in the overlap year, 1987. The resulting 
conversion factors, shown in the first column of Table A1, are 1 for most sectors, 




An alternative procedure would have been to match the 1972 SIC cash flow data to 
1972 SIC investment data through 1986, but BEA staff advised against trying to use old 
1972 SIC investment data because such data had not participated in a number of 
benchmark and related retroactive revisions made after the adoption of SIC 1987, nor is 
this data available electronically. Hence we brought the cash flow data through 1986 to 
the 1987 SIC basis instead and related them to the investment data on the same SIC ba-
sis.  
 
I.B.  Dealing with Data Missing in Two Manufacturing-Industry Sectors 
 
Among the explanatory data needed to adjust measures of cash flow in sector i for iden-
tifiable deviations from equilibrium are disturbances in two relative prices. The first is 
the relative price of each manufacturing sector’s gross output (PGOit) to that of total 
manufacturing (PGOmt). The second is the relative price of each sector’s intermediate 
inputs (PIIit) relative to the price of its value added (PVAit).  
 
Chain-type price indexes identified as GOPI, IIPI, and VAPI in the INDUSTRY source 
described are available only from 1977 on (on the SIC72 basis) but not until 1987 (on 
the SIC87 basis) for two sectors, “electric and electronic equipment” and “instruments 
and related products.” For these two sectors, current dollar values of GO and II are also 
not available until 1987. To be able to work with identical complete data sets, the miss-
ing data for GOPI and IIPI were generated for the two sectors by fitting an exponential 
time trend to the price index data reported annually for 1987-1997 on the SIC 1987 ba-
sis. The estimated trend rate of growth was then used to extend the data series backward 
to 1977 from the predicted (rather than actual) 1987 value implied by the regression 
estimate with time trend (1987=0, 1997=10) fitted to the log-transformed data. How-
ever, to extend the share of intermediates in gross output, II/GO, from 1987 backwards 
to 1977 for the two sectors, we simply kept their 1987 value for the earlier years for lack 
of a clear trend from 1987 on.  
 
I.C.  Estimating Taxes on Corporate Profits and Proprietors’ Income by Industry 
Sector Classified on an Establishment, Rather than Firm, Basis  
 
For the entire period used here, 1977-1997, income taxes by industry sector, that are 
reported only for corporations, had to be estimated for corporations and proprietors 
when establishments (by establishment-SIC), and not entire firms (by firm-SIC), are 
assigned to industry sectors. 
 
The INDUSTRY source uses the establishment basis. While this is essential if structural 
and technological characteristics are to be attributed to industry sectors or their “exter-
nal” financing needs, no allocation of income taxes (as opposed to taxes on production 
and imports, less subsidies) has been attempted in this source. In Tables 6.18B (used for 
1977-87) and 6.18C (used for 1987-1997) of NIPAWEB for corporation income taxes, 
and in Tables 6.17B ( for 1977-87) and 6.17C (for 1987-97) for corporate profits with-
out inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCA), 
identical values are reported for all sectors in the overlap year 1987. This is because the 
allocation of firms (as opposed to establishments within firms) by industry sector has 
not changed from SIC72 to SIC87. We therefore estimated income taxes on corporate 
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profits and proprietors’ income in each sector by multiplying the tax liabilities reported 
in Tables 6.18 by the ratio of the sum of INDUSTRY Corporate Profits and Proprietors’ 
Income, both without IVA and CCA, to the corporate profits, also without IVA and 
CCA, reported in Tables 6.17 identified above. This ratio or adjustment factor thus was 
calculated only for total manufacturing each year and then applied to the tax liabilities 
of each of its sectors in the corresponding year to assure macroeconomic consistency.  
 
The alternative, of using the tax and profits data available on a firm-SIC basis to obtain 
a tax rate that can then be applied to the sum of corporate profits and proprietors’ in-
come reported on an establishment-SIC basis to estimate the tax liabilities of that IN-
DUSTRY sector, had to be rejected. The reason is that, because profitable firms paying 
taxes are combined with unprofitable firms in the tax and income aggregates reported 
by sector, such a rate would bear no relation to a statutory income tax rate. Indeed it 
could be very high, when the sector as a whole has close to zero net income even though 
it contains a number of tax-paying firms, or negative if the sector is making losses in the 
aggregate in a particular year. Hence it is not valid to use one set of tax revenue and net 
income data by sector to obtain a tax rate that can be applied to another set of net in-
come data, not even in the same sector. 
 
I.D.  Constructing Cash Flow from the INDUSTRY Database 
 
The components of VA listed in the INDUSTRY database yield an estimate of cash-
flow before taxes on proprietors’ income and corporate profits from which such taxes, 
estimated as described in the previous section, must still be subtracted to approximate 
the concept of cash flow used by RZ. Specifically: 
 
 Gross Value Added 
 - Wage and Salary Accruals 
 - Supplements to Wages and Salaries 
 - Taxes on Production and Imports, less Subsidies 
= Gross Operating Surplus 
 - Corporate and Noncorporate Net Interest and Miscellaneous Payments 
 - Business Current Transfer Payments 
= Cash Flow before Income Taxes, where 
 
Cash Flow before Income Taxes is the sum of : 
 Proprietors’ Income without IVA 
 -- IVA 
 Corporate Profits before Tax without IVA 
 -- IVA 
 Capital Consumption Allowances, Corporate 
 Capital Consumption Allowances, Noncorporate Business 
 
From these Components of Value Added in the INDUSTRY Source, the matching esti-
mate of corporate and noncorporate income taxes is subtracted to obtain cash flow by 
industry sector on the establishment basis. 
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I.E.  Deviations from the Rajan and Zingales Measure of Cash Flow and of DEF 
 
(a)  Unlike the estimate used by RZ (1998, p. 564), this measure of cash flow does not 
add (subtract) decreases (increases) in inventories, decreases (increases) in receiv-
ables, and increases (decreases) in payables into the measure of cash flow. For 
details of RZ’s treatment see also Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT (North 
America) User Guide 3/99, Chapter 4: Financial Statements, p. 12: Operating Ac-
tivities – Net Cash Flow Format Code 7, data item #308. “Effective for fiscal 
years ending July 15, 1988, the SFAS #95 requires U.S. companies to report the 
statement of Cash Flows (format code = 7)” (p. 11). 
 
(b)  The RZ measure was constructed for listed corporations by summing the annual 
COMPUSTAT data for capital expenditure (CE) and cash-flow (CF) over the en-
tire decade of the 1980s before estimating DEF rates (by subtracting CF from CE 
and then dividing by CE) by use of these ten-year aggregates. RZ chose the me-
dian of the resulting corporate values in any industry sector to represent the DEF 
of that sector. Conceptually it is preferable to average annual estimates of DEF 
over these ten years to derive a representative value for the sector. The reason is 
that working with ratios of 10-year aggregates of nominal values tends to give 
more weight to the more recent than the more distant years on account of con-
tinuing growth and inflation. However, experimentally constructing measures of 
DEF on either basis for the 11-year period 1987-1997 showed that the correlation 
between the resulting industry-sector DEF measures -- one based on working with 
11-year aggregates to obtain the sector’s characteristic DEF measure and one av-
eraging 11 annual DEF estimates to derive such a measure -- turned out to be 
0.9992. 
 
(c) The basis for industrial classification used by RZ is the firm rather than the estab-
lishment. Hence all the, possibly quite diverse, operations of a firm in a variety of 
sectors are attributed to its largest sector of operation. This detracts from the vi-
ability of any “structural” or “technological” interpretation that can be put on ob-
served differences in the dependence on external financing of the firms assigned to 
a particular industry sector. For instance, firms may contain establishments with 
very different “external” funding needs so that there may be large financial trans-
fers between establishments that are internal to the firm. Indeed firms may be con-
figured in part to achieve greater financial autarky through averaging between es-
tablishments operating in different sectors. While use of the data provided on an 
establishment basis by the BEA appears conceptually superior for the purposes at 
hand, it does introduce an element of incomparability with the RZ data. 
 
(d) RZ used the accounts of the median firm to characterize conditions in the 
manufacturing industry sector to which it has been assigned. Since such a sector 
inevitably can contain only a few large, but many small firms, the median firm, 
outside a few strictly oligopolistic sectors is likely to be small. Hence the median 
firm may not be representative of the aggregate financing conditions for all the 
firms in an industry sector. Results may be sensitive to industrial organization and 
conglomeration of the firms in the sector, and to its concentration ratio which, 
unless dictated by economies of scale at the establishment level, may not be a 
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deeply structural characteristic. Being comparatively small and specialized, the 
median firm may, however, fit better with an establishment concept than with a 
firm concept of industrial classification because large and diversified firms may 
dominate the aggregate financing pattern observed in their sector. 
 
I. F.  BEA Definitions and Differences in Industrial Classification by Corporation 
or other Legal Form, and by Establishment 
 
BEA Definitions, from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/FAweb/Articles/Intro.html, are 
used here that relate to the valuation of investment and the definition of establishment:  
 
(a)  “Historical-cost valuation measures the value of fixed assets in the prices of the 
period in which the assets were purchased new.”  Aggregate measures of histori-
cal-cost investment thus are identical to nominal gross fixed investment in the 
GDP accounts. “Current-cost valuation measures the value of assets in the prices 
of a given period, which are end-of-year for stocks and annual averages for depre-
ciation.” Current-cost estimates of depreciation thus differ from historical-cost es-
timates of depreciation (without capital consumption adjustment) which are a 
component of value added in that they represent replacement-cost estimates of the 
BEA-economic (rather than business or tax-accounting) depreciation of fixed 
capital assets valued at current-period prices. 
 
(b) “Establishments, as defined for the purposes of the SIC, are economic units, 
generally at a single physical location, where business is conducted or where ser-
vices or industrial operations are performed.” 
 
Comment: In the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade 
Corporations of the U.S. Census Bureau (e.g., Quarter 4, 2000, p. x), “a reporting cor-
poration is initially classified into the SIC division accounting for more gross receipts 
than any other SIC division... For the most part, after a corporation is assigned to a divi-
sion, it is further classified by the two-digit SIC major group accounting for more gross 
receipts than any other two-digit group within the division.”  The identification of cor-
porations by SIC group in NIPA accounts such as “corporate profits by industry,” and 
of listed corporations in Compustat, follows the same scheme. Unless all establishments 
of a corporation are assigned to the same classification because the corporation is not 
vertically integrated and not horizontally conglomerated, classifications by establish-
ment and by corporation do not agree. 
 
I.G.  BLS Data Source: Employment in Manufacturing 
 
The only non-BEA data source used in this paper is the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) (http://data.bls.gov). It provides data for total manufacturing employment: Manu-
facturing, All Employees, Thousands, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Annual, Series ID: 
CEU3000000001. The data was used to generate deviations of the logarithm of em-
ployment from its estimated trend value for 1977-1997, where the exponentially de-
clining trend in total manufacturing employment was estimated from 1976 (t=0) to 1998 
(t=22). These deviations, DlnLmt, are meant to characterize cyclical conditions in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole that might help explain short-run fluctuations in RIF in 
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cyclically-sensitive manufacturing industry sectors. DlnLmt is used together with the 
relative-price deviations Dln(PGOit/PGOmt) and Dln(PIIit/PVAit) to adjust the annual 
values of RIF for temporary disturbances.  
 
II. Statistical Comparisons of RZ data of DEF with Our Data 
 
II.A.  Correspondences of Industrial Classifications  
 
RZ data by sector are for the median publicly listed corporation in each manufacturing-
industry sector, with the entire operations of a firm assigned to just one sector using the 
International Standard Statistical Classification (ISIC), Revision 2 (Rev. 2). Our data 
are for all corporations and proprietorships with establishments operating in a particular 
sector classified by SIC87, or converted to that classification. Hence the first task is to 
map the data reported on the ISIC (Rev. 2) basis into the U.S. 1987 SIC classification. 
This is done for RZ’s “all” and “mature” companies in Tables A2 and A3, respectively. 
Table A4 compares the RZ measures, which represent averages for 1980-89, reclassi-
fied to the SIC 1987 basis, to our measures for that same period as well as the earlier 
periods, 1976-1986 and 1987-1997, to gain insights into the intertemporal stability of 
these measures. Finally, Table A5 reports correlations of the various unweighted and 
weighted RZ measures and our measures which were obtained as annual averages of the 
ratios estimated for each year rather than as the ratio of decadal firm aggregates, as in 
RZ. 
 
II.B.  Correlation Results with Unweighted Data  
 
The first panel in Table A5 shows that the “internal” correlation between RZ’s measures 
of DEF for “all” and “mature” companies is 0.475. The correlation of our aggregate 
measure is much higher with RZ’s “mature companies” than with the “all companies” 
measure, -- 0.53 compared with 0.24 in a precise time match: “Mature” companies un-
doubtedly have by far the largest weight in our complete industry-sector aggregates. 
 
II.C.  Correlation Results Using Investment-Weighted Data by Sector 
 
Because annual fixed investment in private assets by industry forms the denominator of 
RIF and DEF, it is appropriate to weight by the amount of such investment in each sec-
tor to examine whether correlations found with equally weighted (“unweighted”) data 
are representative of macroeconomic relations for those sectors. Weighting is especially 
necessary because the investment shares of the 21 sectors distinguished in Table A1 can 
differ by a factor of as much as 75 for 1980-89 and by even more in other periods. For 
instance, the average annual share in 1987-1997 of Leather and Leather Products is 
0.001 while that of Chemicals and Allied Products is 0.148. Using the square-root of the 
average annual weights for the middle period, 1980-89, as weights here, Table A5 
shows correlations between our and the RZ measures to be slightly negative in a precise 
time match in the second panel of Table A5. The positive correlations between RZ’s 
measures and ours that were found with unweighted data in Table A5 thus do not apply 
to those manufacturing sectors in which the bulk of investment occurs. On the other 
hand, the positive “internal” correlation between the two weighted RZ measures rises to  
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Table A1.  Conversion Factors and 10- or 11-Year Averages of Annual Investment 
Weights for 1987 SIC U.S. Manufacturing Sectors 
 
 Conversion Weights 
 Factor 1976-1986 1980-1989 1987-1997 
Column: 1 2 3 4 
Lumber 1.009 0.027 0.022 0.019 
Furniture  1 0.008 0.009 0.009 
Stone Clay Glass 0.932 0.034 0.030 0.026 
Primary Metals 1 0.070 0.057 0.049 
Fabricated Metal 1.001 0.052 0.050 0.047 
Machinery 1.019 0.105 0.103 0.088 
Electric Machinery 0.989 0.092 0.104 0.109 
Motor Vehicles 1 0.069 0.067 0.070 
Other Transpo. Equip. 0.947 0.042 0.050 0.038 
Instruments 1.097 0.039 0.047 0.049 
Misc. Manufactures 1 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Food & Beverages 1 0.084 0.085 0.089 
Tobacco 1 0.008 0.009 0.005 
Textiles 1 0.022 0.022 0.022 
Apparel 1 0.010 0.009 0.008 
Paper 0.996 0.065 0.069 0.072 
Printing 1 0.044 0.053 0.055 
Chemical Products 1 0.132 0.123 0.148 
Petrol. & Coal Prod. 1 0.052 0.046 0.042 
Rubber & Plastics 1.086 0.032 0.035 0.045 
Leather Products 1 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Sum -- 1 1 1 
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Table A2.  RZ’s “All Companies” Estimate of Manufacturing Industries’ Depend-
ence on External Finance (DEF) Extended from ISIC Rev. 2 to US-SIC 1972 and 
1987 Using 1987 Investment Weights in Total U.S. Manufacturing 
Industry Classifications   RZ-DEF 
SIC72 SIC87 Rev. 2 Manufacturing Sector %Weight Rev. 2 SIC72 SIC87 
  311 Food Products (P.) 5.622  0.14   
  313 Beverages 1.533  0.08   
20 20 311-313 Food and Kindred P.   0.127 0.127 
21 21 314 Tobacco Manufactures 0.593 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
  321x Textile Manufacturing 1.374  0.40   
  3211 Spinning, Weaving 1.598 -0.09   
22 22 321 Textile Mill Products   0.137 0.137 
23 23 322 Apparel from Fabrics  0.625  0.03 0.03 0.03 
  323 Leather Products 0.075 -0.14   
  324 Footwear 0.052 -0.08   
31 31 323+324 Leather & Leather P.   -0.115 -0.115
24 24 331 Lumber & Wood Prod. 1.738  0.28 0.28 0.28 
25 25 332 Furniture and Fixtures 0.815  0.24 0.24 0.24 
  341x Paper and Paper Prod. 2.285  0.18   
  3411 Pulp, Paper(board) 4.807  0.15   
26 26 341 Paper & Allied Prod.   0.160 0.160 
27 27 342 Printing & Publishing 6.268  0.20 0.20 0.20 
  3511 Basic Ind. Chemicals 4.079  0.25   
  3513 Synthetic Materials 2.428  0.16   
  352x Other Chemicals 2.234  0.22   
  3522 Drugs and Medicines 2.234  1.49   
28 28 351+352 Chemicals & Allied P.   0.476 0.476 
  353 Petroleum Refining 2.599  0.04   
  354 Petroleum & Coal  P. 0.391  0.33   
29 29 353+354 Petr. Ref. and Related   0.078 0.078 
  355 Rubber Products 0.906  0.23   
  356 Plastic Products 3.598  1.14   
30 30 355+356 Rubber & Plastics P.   0.957 0.957 
  361 Pottery, China 0.106 -0.15   
  362 Glass and Products 0.994  0.53   
  369 Other NM Mineral P. 2.095  0.06   
32 32 361+2+9 Clay Glass Concrete P.   0.199 0.199 
  371 Iron & Steel 2.834  0.09   
  372 Nonferrous Metals 1.856  0.01   
33 33 371+372 Primary Metal Indus.   0.058 0.058 
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Table A2 cont’d 
 
Industry Classifications   RZ-DEF 
SIC72 SIC87 Rev. 2 Manufacturing Sector %Weight Rev. 2 SIC72 SIC87 
34 34 381 Fabricated Metal P.  4.367 0.24 0.24 0.24 
  382x Machinery ex. Electr.  6.890 0.45   
  3825 Office & Computing  2.805 1.06   
35 35 382 Machinery ex. Electr.   0.626 0.626 
  383x Electric Machinery  2.771 0.77   
  3832 Radio, TV, Commun.  5.954 1.04   
36 36 383 Electr. and Electronic   0.954 0.954 
  384x Transportation Equip.   4.727 0.31   
  3841 Shipbuilding &Repair   0.520 0.46   








ex. Motor Vehicles 
  0.325 0.325 
38 38 385 Prof. and Sci. Equip.  4.759 0.96 0.96 0.96 
39 39 390 Other Manuf. Product  0.807 0.47 0.47 0.47 
        







Animal Feeds &  
Food Prod. n.e.c. 
   0.461 NR   
in 28 in 28 3512 Fertilizers and Pestic.    2.036 NR   
   Effect of Rounding   -0.002    
   Total 100    
 
Notes: Suffix x (column 3) indicates that data refer to a 3-digit class minus any 4-digit class(es) shown 
below it. Classes not appearing directly in RZ but obtained by combination of their data are shown in 
italics. The concordances in the first three columns between US-SIC 1972 and 1987 and, in turn, ISIC 
Rev. 2 are approximate. The weights in column 5 are derived from the 1987 distribution of U.S. manu-
facturing investment (totaling $78,299 million) by up to 4 digits shown in OECD, Industrial Surveys – 
ISIC Rev. 2, Vol. 2003 release 01. The RZ-DEF (Rev. 2) data in column 6 are taken from Rajan and 
Zingales (1998, 566-67) where data with a combined weight of 2.5% are not reported (NR). The DEF 
data in the last two columns are constructed as weighted averages of the RZ estimates shown in col. 6. By 
definition, DEF = 1 - RIF. 
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Table A3. RZ’s “Mature Companies” Estimate of Manufacturing Industries’ De-
pendence on External Finance (DEF) Extended from ISIC Rev. 2 to US-SIC 1972 
and 1987 Using 1987 Investment Weights in Total U.S. Manufacturing 
Industry Classifications   RZ-DEF 
SIC72 SIC87 Rev. 2 Manufacturing Sector %Weight Rev. 2 SIC72 SIC87 
  311 Food Products (P.) 5.622 -0.05   
  313 Beverages 1.533 -0.15   
20 20 311-313 Food and Kindred P.   -0.071 -0.071 
21 21 314 Tobacco Manufactures 0.593 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 
  321x Textile Manufacturing 1.374  0.14   
  3211 Spinning, Weaving 1.598 -0.04   
22 22 321 Textile Mill Products   0.043 0.043 
23 23 322 Apparel from Fabrics  0.625 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  323 Leather Products 0.075 -1.33   
  324 Footwear 0.052 -0.57   
31 31 323+324 Leather & Leather P.   -1.019 -1.019 
24 24 331 Lumber & Wood Prod. 1.738  0.25 0.25 0.25 
25 25 332 Furniture and Fixtures 0.815  0.33 0.33 0.33 
  341x Paper and Paper Prod. 2.285  0.10   
  3411 Pulp, Paper(board) 4.807  0.13   
26 26 341 Paper & Allied Prod.   0.120 0.120 
27 27 342 Printing & Publishing 6.268  0.14 0.14 0.14 
  3511 Basic Ind. Chemicals 4.079  0.08   
  3513 Synthetic Materials 2.428 -0.23   
  352x Other Chemicals 2.234 -0.18   
  3522 Drugs and Medicines 2.234  0.03   
28 28 351+352 Chemicals & Allied P.   -0.052 -0.052 
  353 Petroleum Refining 2.599 -0.02   
  354 Petroleum & Coal  P. 0.391  0.16   
29 29 353+354 Petr. Ref. and Related   0.004 0.004 
  355 Rubber Products 0.906 -0.12   
  356 Plastic Products 3.598  NR   
30 30 355+356 Rubber & Plastics P.   -0.12 -0.12 
  361 Pottery, China 0.106  0.16   
  362 Glass and Products 0.994  0.03   
  369 Other NM Mineral P. 2.095  0.15   
32 32 361+2+9 Clay Glass Concrete P.   0.113 0.113 
  371 Iron & Steel 2.834  0.09   
  372 Nonferrous Metals 1.856  0.07   
33 33 371+372 Primary Metal Indus.   0.082 0.082 
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Table A3 cont’d 
 
Industry Classifications   RZ-DEF 
SIC72 SIC87 Rev. 2 Manufacturing Sector %Weight Rev. 2 SIC72 SIC87 
34 34 381 Fabricated Metal P.  4.367  0.04 0.04 0.04 
  382x Machinery ex. Electr.  6.890  0.22   
  3825 Office & Computing  2.805  0.26   
35 35 382 Machinery ex. Electr.   0.232 0.232 
  383x Electric Machinery  2.771  0.23   
  3832 Radio, TV, Commun.  5.954  0.39   
36 36 383 Electr. and Electronic   0.339 0.339 
  384x Transportation Equip.   4.727  0.16   
  3841 Shipbuilding &Repair   0.520  0.04   






ex. Motor Vehicles 
  0.148 0.148 
38 38 385 Prof. and Sci. Equip.  4.759  0.19 0.19 0.19 
39 39 390 Other Manuf. Product  0.807 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
        







Animal Feeds &  
Food Prod. n.e.c. 
   0.461 NR   
in 28 in 28 3512 Fertilizers and Pestic.    2.036 NR   
   Effect of Rounding   -0.002    
   Total 100    
 






Table A4.  Reclassified RZ DEF Measures and Our Measures of DEF, Various 
Periods, for 1987 SIC U.S. Manufacturing Sectors, and their Weighted Average 
 
 1980-1989 RZ Def DEF 
 All Co's Mature Co's 1976-1986 1980-1989 1987-1997 
Column: 1 2 3 4 5 
Lumber 0.28 0.25 -2.151 -2.850 -3.460 
Furniture  0.24 0.33 -0.835 -0.980 -1.000 
Stone Clay Glass 0.199 0.113 0.011 0.094 -0.355 
Primary Metals 0.058 0.082 0.112 0.099 -0.137 
Fabricated Metal 0.24 0.04 -1.054 -1.269 -1.589 
Machinery 0.626 0.232 -0.667 -0.736 -0.902 
Electric Machinery 0.954 0.339 -0.278 -0.654 -1.806 
Motor Vehicles 0.39 0.11 -1.251 -1.720 -1.421 
Other Transpo. Eq. 0.325 0.148 1.449 1.050 1.120 
Instruments 0.96 0.19 -0.040 0.568 1.003 
Misc. Manufactr. 0.47 -0.05 -2.280 -3.235 -4.133 
Food & Beverages 0.127 -0.071 -0.670 -0.822 -0.727 
Tobacco -0.45 -0.38 -1.465 -1.061 -5.023 
Textiles 0.137 0.043 -0.265 -0.152 -0.199 
Apparel 0.03 -0.02 -2.272 -2.303 -2.197 
Paper 0.16 0.12 -0.131 -0.212 -0.229 
Printing 0.2 0.14 -1.477 -1.121 -0.952 
Chemical Products 0.476 -0.052 -0.602 -0.905 -1.159 
Petrol.&Coal Prod. 0.078 0.004 1.230 1.075 0.565 
Rubber & Plastics 0.957 -0.12 -0.234 -0.169 0.106 
Leather Products -0.115 -1.019 -2.653 -4.357 -6.755 
Weighted Average 0.370 0.078 -0.518 -0.658 -0.934 
 
Notes: The data in columns 1 and 2, reclassified from 36 ISIC Rev. 2 sectors to 21 1987 SIC sectors, are 
obtained from Tables A2 and A3, respectively. To obtain the weighted average shown in the last row, 
weighting is by the square-root of the capital expenditure weights by sector (Wi) shown in the fourth 
column of Table 2 in the text and, more rounded, in the third column of numbers in Table A1, with the 
square-root weights, Wi0.5, normalized to 1. 
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Table A5.  Correlation Matrices for RZ's and Our Average Annual Measures of 
DEF for Various Time Periods 
 
    
 (1) Correlation of RZ measures of DEF and our measure for 1980-89 
    
   AVG8089 RZ-DEF RZ-MAT   
  AVG80-89 1   
  RZ-DEF 0.2396  1   
  RZ-MAT 0.5346 0.4750 1   
    
    
 (1a) Correlation of same measures weighted by investment share* 
    
   WAVG889 WRZDEF WRZMAT   
  WAVG889 1   
  WRZDEF -0.1108 1   
  WRZMAT -0.0561 0.6119 1   
    
    
 (2) Correlation of our measures of DEF, 1976-86 and 1987-97, with RZ's 
    
   AVG77-86 AVG87-97 RZ-DEF RZ-MAT  
  AVG77-86 1   
  AVG87-97 0.8684 1   
  RZ-DEF 0.2760 0.4055 1   
  RZ-MAT 0.4587 0.6542 0.4750 1  
    
    
 Glossary: RZ-DEF Rajan and Zingales' measure of Dependence on 
  External Finance for "All" Companies  
  RZ-MAT Same measure for "Mature" Companies only 
  AVG80-89 Average of annual values of our measure of DEFadj 
  WAVG889 1980-1989 --weighted   
  AVG77-86 Same measure for 1977-1986   
  AVG87-97 Same measure for 1987-1997   
  W (Prefix) Using weighted variables 
*Mean deviants of individual observations that are weighted 
by the square-root of Wi -- where Wi is the average annual 
investment share in each sector for 1980-89 -- yield products 




0.612, from 0.475 for the unweighted measures, showing that the DEF measures for 
“all” and “mature” companies correlate more closely for large than for small sectors.  
 
II.D.  Intertemporal Correlations  
 
Examining correlations between non-overlapping annual averages of our DEF data for 
1977-1986 and 1987-1997 shows a correlation of 0.87 in the third panel of Table A5 
indicating a fairly high degree of intertemporal consistency. Nevertheless, the correla-
tion between the earlier (1977-1986) measure and RZ’s two measures is far lower than 
with the later (1987-1997) measure, 0.46 compared with 0.65 for “mature” and 0.28 
compared with 0.41 for “all” companies. Because certain data used in parts of this 
study, such as the chain-type price indexes for gross output, intermediate inputs, and 
value added, are available only from 1977 on, and other data, such as the components of 
value added on the SIC87 basis, are not reported past 1997, this study deals with a 
maximum of 21 (1977-1997) annual observations. 
 
Appendix 3. The Weighting Variable and its Applications and Transformations 
 
The weighting variable, Wi, is shown in column 4 of Table 2 in the text. Introducing 
weights complicates understanding of the decompositions of the Sum of Squared Total 
(SST) deviations, where grouping is either by sector (i) or time (t), into their within-
sector (SSW) and Between-Sector (SSB) deviations. Because SST(i) must equal SST(t) 
since grouping affects only the decomposition of SST, not its total value, it follows that 
SSW(i) + SSB(i) = SSW(t) + SSB(t).  
 
The text box on the next page explains the decomposition for any variable, generically 
called  Xit, when weighting by sector (i). As shown near the bottom of that box, the 
weighting variable on the individual variables, Wi, is transformed automatically to wi 
for use on the sum of squares in the statistical program.21 This transformation is 
designed to equate the sum of these weights, with each wi repeated T times, to the total 
number of observations, which in this case is N = TS = 441, where S = 21 sectors and T 
= 21 years (1977-97). This sum of weights then is the same as in the “unweighted” case 
where wi = 1 for all i at any t, allowing direct comparisons between “unweighted” and 
“weighted” results reported in Table 3 in the text. 
 
                                                 
21    The program is LIMDEP, version 8.0, by William H. Greene, Econometric Software, Inc 
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